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1. Introduction 
There is a lot of evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on the economic well-
being of the society. In general it seems that countries, which are more ethnically diverse, are also 
poorer. At first this might seem counter-intuitive. It is easy to think of counter-examples, where 
multiethnic societies are very successful. United States and Switzerland are two examples that 
easily come to mind. 
One explanation for this apparent conflict between empirical evidence and these common 
perceptions might be that ethnic fractionalization has different effect in different institutional 
contexts
1
.  Maybe in liberal democracies such as the United States and Switzerland ethnic 
fractionalization is not really that harmful, while in societies that are less liberal and less 
democratic, such as many societies in Africa, ethnic fractionalization is more harmful. 
There is indeed some evidence that institutional context matters for the effects of ethnic 
fractionalization, such as Easterly (2001) and Collier (2001). They present empirical evidence that 
the under different contexts ethnic fractionalization affects growth differently, and the latter paper 
also presents some theoretical justification for the differing effect in different contexts. Besides 
these two studies, there are, as far as I can tell, only two newer studies that study issues related to 
the question at hand, Miguel (2004) and Ahlerup and Hansson (2012), both of which study the topic 
from a slightly different angle. 
There is a large literature in economics on the effects of ethnic fractionalization on growth. It is not 
completely clear, how the findings of papers such as Easterly (2001) and Collier (2001) relate to 
this larger literature, especially since a lot of this literature has been published after 2001, the year 
in which these two papers were published.  
The other gap in the research is that the empirical findings of the papers are not completely 
convincing. Any study that has some measure of institutions as an independent variable is going to 
face problems of endogeneity. While institutions or institutions together with ethnic 
fractionalization might plausible affect growth, growth might also plausible affect institutions, as 
richer societies can afford better institutions. 
                                                          
1
 By institutions in this thesis I refer mainly to political institutions. Such institutions refer to, whether there are checks 
and balances on the executive, whether property rights are respected and whether the leaders are democratically 
elected. Obviously there are other institutions out there that might also create contexts, where ethnic 
fractionalization affects growth differently. One example of such institution might be religions. However, to keep the 
scope of this thesis manageable, I will only focus on political institutions. 
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There are two main research objectives for the thesis at hand. I will try to relate the issue of 
institutional context to the larger literature about ethnic fractionalization and economic growth 
through a literature review on the topic. 
In the literature review, I will review papers that establish a strong link between ethnic 
fractionalization and economic well-being and also review some papers that show that the 
relationship is probably causal. 
I will also review different models about how ethnic fractionalization negatively affects society. 
The five possible reasons are that ethnic fractionalization leads to a lower provision of public goods, 
resource expropriation by a dominant ethnic group, civil wars, lower social capital or to worse 
institutions.  
The second objective of the thesis is to provide some new empirical evidence on the issue. I am 
going to try to address the issue of endogeneity by using an instrument for institutions. I will use 
settler mortality in former colonies as an instrument for institutions following Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001). My focus is also somewhat different from Easterly (2001) and Collier (2001) 
since I concentrate more on long-run economic well-being as measured by GDP/capita rather than 
short-term growth. 
I cannot find any empirical evidence for my hypothesis that good institutions mitigate the negative 
effects of ethnic fractionalization. The regressions without instrumenting for institutions show that 
good institutions might actually exacerbate the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization in former 
colonies. In the regressions, where institutions are instrumented for there is little evidence that 
institutions are relevant in any way. They don’t seem to mitigate or exacerbate the negative effects 
of ethnic fractionalization. 
The next section in the thesis presents empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization does actually 
cause lower economic growth and will lead also lead to worse longer-term economic well-being. I 
will also introduce previous empirical work suggesting that this effect might be different under 
different institutional contexts. In the following section 3 I go through various theories on why 
ethnic fractionalization might have a negative effect on economic well-being. I will also comment 
on how these theories might have different effects in different institutional contexts. For every 
theory presented, I will also discuss empirical evidence, which might prove or disprove the theory. 
For the fourth section of the paper I will present my own empirical investigation on the interplay 
between institutions and ethnic fractionalization. The fifth section concludes.  
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2. Ethnic Fractionalization and Growth 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to present the empirical starting point for my work. I will show that 
there is strong evidence that ethnic fractionalization is indeed negatively related to economic well-
being. I will also show that the relationship seems to be causal. Then I will present evidence that 
suggest that the effect of ethnic fractionalization is different, when the institutional context is 
different, which motivates the main approach of the thesis.  
 
2.2 Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization 
Before delving deeper into the effect of ethnic fractionalization on economic well-being, I will 
briefly discuss, what ethnic fractionalization actually is, and how to measure it. The generally used 
measure for ethnic fractionalization (EF) is the following: 
      ∑(
  
 
)
 
 
   
          
where    is the size of one ethnic group and N is the size of the whole population. The measure 
corresponds to the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population are 
members of different ethnic groups.  
When constructing this measure empirically, the next question is what constitutes an ethnic group. 
There are actually several answers to this question, and I will present the two commonly used 
sources for the data on ethnic fractionalization. I will discuss the data in more detail, in the 
empirical section, when I discuss, which data I will use and why. 
The most commonly used data on different ethnic groups comes from Atlas Narodov Mira, which is 
a Soviet constructed encyclopedia on different linguistic groups in the world. The encyclopedia was 
constructed in the 1960’s. Easterly and Levine (1997) was among the first empirical papers to use 
this data and they summarize previous papers noting that the fact that the encyclopedia was Soviet 
constructed didn’t introduce any bias to the results. According to Easterly and Levine there seem to 
be no ideologically based findings in the encyclopedia. 
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Posner (2004) notes, that the fact that the data is from 1960’s might cause some problems. Since 
then there have been changes in the ethnic makeup of the countries and the changes are not random. 
For example, civil wars might cause significant changes in the ethnic makeup of a country. Civil 
wars also affect economic development, so using older data on ethnic fractionalization when 
studying growth might give misleading results. 
Another frequently used source of data is Alesina et al. (2003). The paper constructs and index that 
is more current and relies on more than one sources for the different ethnic groups in the country. 
These alternative sources include: Encyclopedia Britannica 2001, CIA World Factbook and 
Minority Rights Group International. 
Alesina et al. (2003) has three different measures for ethnic fractionalization. One is based on 
language, like most indices of ethnic fractionalization are. Other one is based on religion. The third 
index is based on, what are the perceived ethnic groups in the particular country. The differences 
can be based on criteria such as skin color in addition to linguistic differences. 
 
2.3 Empirical Evidence on Ethnic Fractionalization and Growth 
Paper Dependent Variable Independent variable of interest Time Period 
Easterly and 
Levine (1997) 
Average annual growth of 
GDP per capita for different 
decades 
Index of Ethnic Fractionalization 
based on Atlas Narodov Mira 1960-1990 
Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
Average annual growth of 
GDP per capita for different 
decades 
Index of Ethnic Fractionalization 
based on Several Sources 1960-1991 
Alesina et al. 
(2012) 
Level of Per Capita Income 
estimared using data on 
luminosity Ethnic Gini-coefficient 1992, 2000 and 2009 
Ahlerup (2009)  
Log of GDP per capita, 
growth of GDP per capita 
Instrumented Index of Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
2000 for income, 1980-
2000 for growth 
Table 1: Summary of important papers on ethnic fractionalization and growth. 
A paper by Easterly and Levine (1997) studies directly the link between ethnic fractionalization and 
economic growth, using data from Atlas Narodov Mira. They estimate the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization on growth by estimating an OLS regression with ethnic fractionalization and 
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several other control variables as explanatory variables. The paper finds that there is a large and 
significant negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth.  
The result is robust controlling for financial depth of the country, black market premium for the 
foreign exchange rate and fiscal surplus as a percentage of the GDP. The coefficient for ethnic 
fractionalization is not significant however, when controlling for the previously mentioned variables 
and the amount of telephones per worker. All of these variables are correlated with ethnic 
fractionalization, which will lower the coefficient for ethnic fractionalization, especially when 
including several control variables. The authors speculate that the lower coefficient is due to the fact 
that the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth is through these control variables. 
The paper also presents regression, where ethnic fractionalization is an explanatory variable for 
various measures of infrastructure and public policy, used earlier as control variables. According to 
the results there is a strong statistically significant link between ethnic fractionalization and high 
black market premiums, poor financial development, low provision of infrastructure and low levels 
of education. This is in line with the author’s assumption that the negative effect of ethnic 
fractionalization is due to these variables. 
The regressions presented in the paper rely on ethnic fractionalization being exogenous with respect 
to growth and the measures of public policy and infrastructure used in the later regressions. Later in 
this section I present reasons, why this can be doubted, which means that the effects presented here 
might not necessarily be causal. It might also be that the association is based on some unobserved 
factor, not controlled for in the regression. For example, distance from the equator is negatively 
associated with growth and has a positive association with ethnic fractionalization
2
. Based on this 
paper, however, it is reasonable to assume that there is at least a robust negative correlation between 
ethnic fractionalization and GDP growth. 
The assumption that the effect of ethnic fractionalization is due to the policy choice variables 
mentioned is even more problematic. These measures are endogenous with respect to growth, which 
means that if ethnic fractionalization is robustly associated with slow growth through any 
mechanism, it will still have a statistically significant negative association with any of these 
variables. 
                                                          
2
For example the measures of latitude and ethnic fractionalization that I use in my empirical part, have a negative 
correlation with each other of 0.48. 
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Alesina et al. (2003) is an empirical study on ethnic fractionalization that is very similar to Easterly 
and Levine (1997). The main difference is that they compile an index on ethnic fractionalization 
that is not only based on linguistic differences, but also other ethnic characteristics. The results are 
largely similar to those in the Easterly and Levine paper, with ethnic fractionalization having a large 
and significant negative effect on many measures of the country’s wellbeing. 
Alesina et al. (2012) studies the link between ethnic inequality and economic development. Unlike 
the two previous studies, the paper is focused on the level of economic development rather than its 
growth. The paper uses luminosity of an area as seen from space as a proxy for economic 
development. Luminosity refers to, how much light an area emits to space as measured in the night. 
As the paper notes GDP is in general highly correlated with luminosity. The paper then maps 
luminosity to areas occupied by different ethnic groups to estimate a measure on how wealth is 
divided between ethnic groups in a country. The paper then estimates a Gini coefficient to estimate 
ethnic inequality within countries. The measure of ethnic inequality is found to be negatively 
related to per capita income.  
The paper also assesses the robustness of the link by using geographic endowments as an 
instrument for the ethnic inequality. The results remain are basically the same and still statistically 
significant. 
Interestingly, the coefficient for ethnic fractionalization is not significant, when taking ethnic 
inequality into account. This paper is interesting in the regard that it suggests that the significant 
way in which ethnic fractionalization affects society, is through its effect on ethnic inequality and 
not through any effect of its own. This is something that should be kept in mind, when considering 
different causes by which ethnic fractionalization might affect the economic welfare of a society. 
Explanations that are more consistent with ethnic inequality being the ultimate cause are more 
plausible in the light of this empirical investigation. 
While endogeneity might a problem for all these studies and there always might be an omitted 
variable bias, it is safe to say at least, that there exists a very robust negative correlation between 
ethnic fractionalization and economic development. 
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2.4 Possible Endogeneity of Ethnic Fractionalization 
There are several possible reasons, why ethnic fractionalization might be endogenous with respect 
to economic welfare. Economic welfare might affect ethnic diversity itself. If this is the case, it 
becomes very difficult to assess the empirical relationship between these two things. In this section, 
I review mechanisms on why ethnic diversity might be endogenous with respect to economic 
development. I also review a paper by Ahlerup (2009), which tries to solve this problem by using 
instrumental variables. 
One reason for an endogenous relationship between ethnic fractionalization, institutions and growth 
might be colonial past. There is a lot of evidence that colonial institutions affect current institutions. 
(see for example Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001 and Dell 2010). Colonial past might have 
also affected ethnic fractionalization, because of colonial borders splitting ethnic groups and also 
forcing several different ethnicities living in a same country. (Englebert et al. 2002) 
Alesina et al. (2011) is a paper studying the effects of colonial past on current economic 
performance. The paper explains current economic performance in terms of border artificiality, 
which proxies some aspects of the colonial rule. The borders of a country are deemed more 
artificial, if they are closer to a straight line or if they split several ethnic groups to different 
countries. The border artificiality is negatively related income and quality of institutions. Especially 
the latter measure of state artificiality is correlated with ethnic fractionalization. If these border 
artificiality regressions are run controlling for ethnic fractionalization, the coefficient for ethnic 
fractionalization is only sometimes significant, though in most regressions it is significant at least at 
the 10%-level. This still gives an indication that part of the negative effect of ethnic 
fractionalization might only be because it is associated with the colonial past and the colonial 
borders. 
A solution to the endogeneity problem of ethnic diversity is presented in the papers by Ahlerup and 
Olsson (2009) and Ahlerup (2009). The former paper presents determinants for ethnic 
fractionalization and the latter paper uses these determinants as instruments for ethnic diversity 
trying to find out, whether there is indeed a causal effect between ethnic diversity and economic 
wellbeing. 
The Ahlerup and Olsson (2009) paper first presents a theory of how different ethnic groups come 
into being. In the paper ethnic groups are a mechanism for providing public goods. Public goods are 
more efficiently produced, when the group is larger and when there are fewer differences between 
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the recipients of the public goods. With time isolated groups of people develop differences in 
language and genes, and this makes provision of public goods to the group as a whole more 
difficult. With a longer period of time elapsed, it will be cheaper for the isolated groups to form 
their own ethnic groups and provide the public goods only for themselves. 
An empirical prediction of the model is that areas, where humans have lived for longer have more 
ethnic diversity. More fractionalized geography will also lead to higher ethnic diversity, as the 
different groups will be more isolated in these areas. The Ahlerup and Olsson (2009) paper also 
runs regressions testing these empirical predictions of the model. In accordance with the 
predictions, the regression coefficients for both the duration of human settlement and fractionalized 
geography are positively associated with greater ethnic diversity. 
Interestingly for the thesis at hand institutions also seem to affect ethnic diversity. The longer the 
history a state in a certain area, the less ethnic diversity the area will tend to have. This suggests that 
institutions of the state might have deliberately reduced ethnic diversity. An alternative explanation 
is that the bigger scale of human contact that a state provides will facilitate the assimilation of 
different ethnic groups. 
Ahlerup and Olsson (2009) makes previous empirical studies of ethnic fractionalization seem more 
reliable. Clearly ethnic fractionalization is in general determined over very long term, at least when 
comparing countries to each other. Because these determinants are so long-term, it makes sense to 
treat ethnic fractionalization as exogenous with respect to income. 
Ahlerup (2009) uses duration of human settlements, vegetation diversity and also number of years 
since independence and migratory distance from Ethiopia as instruments for ethnic 
fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization is here used as an explanatory variable for the level of 
GDP per capita. Instrumenting for ethnic diversity, it seems that ethnic diversity does have a 
negative impact on current economic welfare. The impact actually seems to be even larger than one 
would assume based on the previous studies. There is also a negative relationship between ethnic 
diversity and corruption. 
Another study that examines the long run determinants of ethnic fractionalization is Michalopoulus 
(2012). The study finds that geographic variability has a statistically significant positive relationship 
to ethnic fractionalization. Geographic variability is measured as standard deviation in the quality of 
land and elevation in land. This again suggests that ethnic fractionalization is determined in the 
long-term and it can be considered exogenous with respect to income. However the study also finds 
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that colonization affected the ethnic structure of the colonies. As colonization affected the colonized 
countries in many ways, besides affecting ethnic fractionalization, there might still be endogeneity 
with respect to income and the ethnic composition of the country 
The evidence thus seems to suggest that ethnic fractionalization is the causal effect for worse 
economic outcomes. It can also be used as an exogenous variable without biasing the results too 
much. It is worth bearing in mind though, that ethnic fractionalization is affected by income and 
that this affect is probably stronger in previously colonialized countries. 
 
2.5 Evidence that Institutional Context Matters 
Paper Dependent Variable Independent variable of interest Time Period 
Collier (2000) 
Average GDP per capita 
growth Ethnic fractionalization*Democracy 1960-1990 
Collier (2001) 
Average GDP per capita 
growth Ethnic fractionalization*Democracy 1960-1990 
Easterly (2001) 
Average annual growth 
of GDP per capita for 
different decades 
Ethnic fractionalization*Average of 
different measures of institutional 
quality 1960-1990 
Miguel (2004) 
Quality of wells, School 
funding Ethnic fractionalization*Kenya 
1996 for Kenya, 2001-
2002 for Tanzania 
Ahlerup and 
Hansson (2012)  
Government 
effectiveness Ethnic fractionalization*nationalism 2008 
Table 2: Summary of important papers about institutional context and the effects of ethnic fractionalization. 
Collier (2000) tests if ethnic diversity affects democracies and dictatorships in a different manner. 
The paper runs a regression with a measure of democracy, ethnic fractionalization and several 
standard variables such as initial income and whether the country is landlocked, as the explanatory 
variables for growth. The paper also includes an interaction term, measure of democracy*ethnic 
fractionalization, for the interaction between democracy and ethnic fractionalization. 
The interaction term is highly significant, with the coefficients for democracy and ethnic 
fractionalization being insignificant. Ethnic diversity is found to be more harmful in less democratic 
societies and with the maximum level of democracy ethnic fractionalization has no effect on 
growth. 
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Collier (2001) runs similar tests as those in Collier (2000). The interaction term of political 
rights*ethnic fractionalization is again significant, with better political rights diminishing the 
negative effects of ethnic diversity. The paper also tests, whether dominance by one ethnic group 
leads to lower levels of growth. The coefficient for dominance is negative, indicating that ethnic 
dominance is bad for economic growth. However the variable is not statistically significant. 
The problem with both of the Collier studies is that democracy might be endogenous with respect to 
income. Economic growth in a country might make it more democratic. This might lead to the 
results of these two studies not being too reliable. 
Another paper empirically examining the interplay between institutions, ethnic fractionalization and 
growth is Easterly (2001). The paper constructs an index for institutional quality composed of (a) 
freedom from government repudiation of contracts, (b) freedom from expropriation, (c) rule of law, 
and (d) bureaucratic quality. Somewhat similarly to Collier (2000) the paper regresses growth on an 
interaction variable of institutions and ethnic fractionalization, on various control variables and on 
ethnic fractionalization as a separate variable. The paper uses in general the same data as Easterly 
and Levine (1997) 
The paper finds that ethnic fractionalization still has a negative effect on growth. The interaction 
variable suggests that better institutions diminish the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on 
growth. With the highest quality institutions ethnic fractionalization has zero marginal effect on 
growth. The effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth seems to go through the same channels as 
in Easterly and Levine (1997) paper with institutions mitigating the effect of ethnic fractionalization 
on all of these. 
The paper also tests, whether the quality of institutions or democracy is the more important 
mechanism diminishing the effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth. The paper adds an 
additional variable, which is an interaction variable between democracy and ethnic 
fractionalization. This variable is insignificant. The results suggest that institutional quality is the 
main factor affecting whether ethnic fractionalization diminishes growth. The result is in contrast 
with the Collier (2000) paper. 
Institutions might be endogenous with growth. The amount of ethnic fractionalization also might 
affect institutional quality. Therefore the Easterly (2001) paper tries to evaluate the effect of 
institutions using instrumental variables. The instrument used for quality of institutions is years of 
independence. Using this instrument, the results are similar to those in the rest of the paper. 
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Institutions mitigate the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth and at the highest level 
of institutions, there is no negative effect.  
The instrument used for institutions in the Easterly (2001) study is not a very good instrument. For 
an instrument to be valid it should only affect the explained variable through the instrumented 
variable and the explained variable should not affect the instrument. Years of independence could 
affect GDP growth through many channels, for example by affecting the integration to international 
trade. Growth is also dependent on current income, and it might be that richer countries either 
gained independence earlier or later affecting both subsequent growth and obviously years of 
independence. 
While endogeneity presents problems for causal interpretation with both studies, their results are 
similar in interesting ways. In both studies, ethnic fractionalization has a negative affect only in bad 
institutional contexts, while at the best level of institutions, there is no negative effect. 
Another empirical study, which gives evidence that institutions matter with regards to ethnic 
fractionalization is Miguel (2004). The starting point of the study is to compare the funding of 
public goods in both Tanzania and Kenya. The study compares two districts in near the border of 
the two countries, Meatu in Tanzania and Busia in Kenya. The motivation is that Tanzania and 
Kenya are very similar in terms of ecology, natural resources and colonial legacy. However, they 
developed different institutions after independence, so if ethnic diversity has a different effect on 
the provision of public goods, this difference should be explained by the different institutions. 
Miguel hypothesizes that the relevant difference between the two countries is the nation building 
programs initiated in Tanzania, but not in Kenya. An example of this is that, Tanzania teaches 
common Tanzanian history in the school curriculum, while the Kenyan teaching of history is more 
based on the histories of different ethnic groups in the area. However the institutional context 
between the two countries is very different in several ways, so some other differences might be 
actually more relevant.  
The measure of public goods is the quality of wells and the amount of money donated to the local 
schools. In addition to having ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an explanatory variable, there is 
also an interaction variable kenya*ethnic fractionalization. 
The result is that, ethnolinguistic fractionalization only has a negative effect on public good 
provision in Kenya, as expected by Miguel. This finding further suggests that institutional context is 
relevant for whether ethnic fractionalization has an effect on the society or not. 
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The result might be endogenous, with Tanzania initially having better ethnic relations, which lead to 
the nation building programs. Miguel also notes, that the interaction between institutions and ethnic 
fractionalization might not be due to the nation building programs. For example there was forced 
migration to villages in Tanzania, which could have led to better ethnic relations, as they had to live 
closer to each other.   
While the comparison between the countries is not perfect the results suggest that institutional 
context does matter. Unfortunately the study doesn’t shed too much light on, what are the relevant 
institutional differences. As Miguel notes, the institutions after independence for the two countries 
were quite different, with Tanzania being socialist. 
Ahlerup and Hansson (2012) also study, how context might affect the negative effects of ethnic 
fractionalization. Similarly to Miguel (2004) the hypothesis is that nationalism might have an effect 
on, whether ethnic diversity is problematic or not. 
The dependent variable is government effectiveness, which is a measure from the World Bank. It is 
intended to measure the government’s ability to implement good policies and to produce public 
goods. Nationalism is measured as the level of national pride in the population, based on surveys. 
The interesting independent variable for the purpose of this master’s thesis, is an interaction 
variable for nationalism*ethnic fractionalization. If nationalism diminishes the negative effects of 
ethnic fractionalization on government effectiveness, this interaction term should be significant and 
positive.  
The interaction term is not statistically significant, so nationalism doesn’t seem to diminish the 
negative effects of ethnic fractionalization. However, if the sample is limited only to countries that 
were former colonies, the effect is significant and nationalism does seem to mitigate the negative 
effects of ethnic fractionalization. 
While the Ahlerup and Hansson (2012) study gives weak indication, that nationalism might affect 
the effects of ethnic fractionalization in former colonies, the results still cast doubt on Miguel’s 
(2004) interpretation of his results. The different effect of ethnic diversity in Tanzania and Kenya 
probably reflect other institutional differences between the two countries, as there is only very weak 
evidence that nationalism can diminish the negative effects of ethnic diversity. 
The general finding of all these studies is that ethnic fractionalization is less harmful in some 
institutional contexts. According to all the studies, except Ahlerup and Hansson (2012), the 
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marginal effect of ethnic fractionalization on development might be even zero in some institutional 
contexts. However, endogeneity might be a problem on all of these studies and it is not completely 
clear which are the relevant institutions driving this result.  
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3. How Ethnic Fractionalization Affects Growth 
3.1 Introduction 
Overall, there is no clear consensus on how and why ethnic fractionalization affects economic 
development. There are, however, several models on how ethnic fractionalization might affect the 
society and these models present varying reasons on, why ethnic fractionalization does have a 
negative effect on development. 
In most models ethnic fractionalization is relevant because of one of these three things: either ethnic 
groups have different preferences, information flows more freely inside ethnic groups or people 
base their vote in an election based on ethnicity. All these reasons provide institutions are role 
determining, whether ethnic fractionalization is harmful or not. Under different institutional 
contexts people’s different preferences are more or less relevant or free flow of information is more 
or less important. 
There are four likely ways, in which ethnic fractionalization might affect the economic welfare of a 
country. Ethnic fractionalization might lead to a lower provision of public goods, exploitation of 
one some ethnic groups by others, a higher likelihood of civil war, or a lower level of social capital 
in the society. It is of course possible that several of these reasons are behind the effects of ethnic 
fractionalization. There also exist several reasons, why all of these effects would be different under 
different institutional contexts. 
Ethnic fractionalization might also have a negative effect on the institutions of the country. In the 
last part of this section, I will discuss this possibility and also, how it causes problems for the 
empirical investigation of the phenomenon that I’m interested in, namely, whether ethnic 
fractionalization has a different effect under different institutional contexts. 
The evidence that ethnic fractionalization affects public goods, is the most robust. The evidence for 
a relationship between ethnic fractionalization and social capital is less robust, but there is quite a 
lot of evidence that the relationship is there. There is the least evidence that ethnic fractionalization 
would actually make civil war more likely. For exploitation, I haven’t been able to find any 
empirical studies for the phenomenon, so it is hard to comment on the evidence one way or another. 
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3.2 Public Goods 
There is robust empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization is related to a lower provision of 
public goods. There are also theoretical reasons for assuming this. For this reason, it is a good 
starting place to start looking for reasons on why ethnic fractionalization might have a negative 
effect on economic development. 
Alesina et al. (1999) presents a simple model, where ethnic diversity leads to a lower number of 
public goods compared to a more homogeneous society. In the model, the welfare of any voter is 
determined by the following utility function: 
     
 (     )    
where   is the public good,   is a parameter on the general effectiveness of public goods ,    is the 
distance between individuals preferred public good and the actual public good and c is private 
consumption.  
Further in the model it is assumed that c = y – t, or income minus taxes. All taxes are spend on 
public good, so g = t.  
The government is assumed to maximize the utility of the median voter  ̂ 
 . So the government 
solves the following maximization 
         
 (    ̂ 
 )      
The solution is  
     (   ̂ 
 )   (   ) 
The amount of public good is diminishing in the median distance from the amount of public good 
determined by the median voter. In a society with highly polarized preferences the median distance 
is longer and therefore there will be less public goods. Ethnic fractionalization will be one measure 
affecting the polarization of the society, if the preferences of the different ethnic groups will be 
different, which is a reasonable assumption. 
According to the model ethnically diverse societies produce less public goods. Insofar as public 
goods are good for economic development, the model would predict more diverse societies to be 
poorer. However the opposite might be true as well, if more public goods would lead to a higher 
level of distortionary taxes. 
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The model in a sense also implies that ethnic fractionalization might have a different impact in 
different institutional contexts. In this model the amount of public good provided is determined by 
the median voter. In a less democratic context it is reasonable to assume that the median voter has 
less impact on public policy choices. One implication of this could be that ethnic fractionalization is 
actually more detrimental in more democratic societies. This of course depends on the assumption 
that higher amount of public goods is actually good for the economy. Higher amount of public 
goods also leads to higher taxes, which might be bad for economic development. In this case, ethnic 
fractionalization would be less bad in democracies, as there are less public goods and less taxes. 
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) present another model with an implication that ethnic diversity reduces 
the provision of public goods. The difference to the Alesina et al. (1999) is that, there it is not 
necessary to assume that the preferences of different ethnic groups are different. The main thrust of 
the model is that social sanctions will lead to a higher level of provision of public goods.  The 
model is basically constructed in relation to the empirical work in the same paper
3
. Because of this, 
the model best applies to situations, where public goods are not provided by the government, 
because in such situations social sanctions will be much more relevant for the provision of public 
goods. 
In the model it is assumed that social sanctions work better inside ethnic groups. As ethnic groups 
for example provide insurance to each other in the case of crop failure, exclusion from the group 
can be very expensive to the member that is excluded. 
The model has two ethnic groups, A and B, with A being the bigger ethnic group. In this setting 
ethnic diversity can be measured simply as the proportion of the group B, with the higher 
proportion meaning higher ethnic diversity.  
A member of an ethnic group chooses     or whether to contribute to providing the public good or 
not. If the member contributes, then     is 1 and this person faces a cost  . The benefits of the public 
good  (  
     
 ) are an increasing function of contributions from both ethnic groups. The social 
sanctions     (
  
  
) is an increasing function of the amount of people from one’s one ethnic group 
that contributes and decreasing in the share of the ethnic group   . The expected utility of an 
individual is: 
 (   )   (  
     
 )       (     ) (
  
  
) 
                                                          
3
 I will discuss this empirical work later in this section. 
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Inside the ethnic group there are two equilibria, one where everybody contributes and one, where 
nobody contributes. The model assumes that the equilibrium with the higher pay-offs will be the 
one chosen. The difference between the equilibrium with contribution and without contribution is: 
 (      
 )     (   
 ) 
The difference is increasing in the size of the ethnic group and weakly decreasing in the expected 
contribution of the other ethnic group. In this case, the public good is always paid for by a 
sufficiently large ethnic group and a sufficiently small ethnic group always free-rides. If the smaller 
ethnic group increases in size (which corresponds to increasing ethnic diversity) the amount of 
freeriders goes up, and there is less provision of public goods. If the share of the smaller ethnic 
group goes up sufficiently, both ethnic groups might free-ride. The model leads to a prediction then 
that more ethnic diversity leads to a lower provision of public goods due to social sanctions. 
In this model, the institutional context is not too relevant. It is possible, however that social 
sanctions are less effective in more modern institutional contexts, as for example modern forms of 
insurance replace the traditional forms of insurance. This would again lead to a lower provision of 
public goods, under a better institutional context. Again this might either be a positive or a negative 
feature. 
Collier (2001) presents a contrasting model, where ethnic fractionalization is more harmful under 
dictatorship and higher ethnic fractionalization actually leads to a higher provision of public goods 
causing higher distortionary taxes and therefore lower growth.  
In this model the politics are characterized by provision of public goods, which only benefit a 
certain part of the population. The taxes required to provide the public goods have a negative effect 
on growth. The representative agent gets the utility: 
  (   )    
where t is taxes and B is the public good received from the government. The budget must be 
balanced so B = tY. Taxation reduces income below its potential (  ) in the following manner. 
  (    )   
Thus in the model, taxes cause the economy to grow slower. The socially optimal solution would be 
to maximize the following function with respect to t: 
(   )(    )    (    )   
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The optimal t in this case is 0. 
In the model the politicians will try to maximize the benefits for their own constituents and will not 
choose the solution that is optimal for the society as a whole. A winning coalition of politicians 
requires more than half of the votes. The way to maximize the benefits of politician’s own 
constituents and still be in a winning coalition is to form a coalition with little over half of the total 
votes. In this case, for the voter of the politician in the winning coalition B = 2tY, and politicians 
would maximize this equation: 
(   )(    )     (    )   
The solution yields a higher t than zero. The growth rate will be lower as it depends negatively on 
taxes. 
It is important to note that the winning coalition is not stable as it could be formed by a different 
group of politicians. Thus, the model leads to a situation, where taxes are permanently above the 
optimal level, but the beneficiaries of the public goods change. 
The politicians could collude to keep the taxes low, if there are sufficient benefits in the long-term. 
The situation is similar to a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, and colluding is easier the fewer 
participants there are. If politicians have to vote according to party lines, there will be in a sense 
fewer participants. Ethnicity might be one way to form stable political parties. If the country is not 
too ethnically fractionalized, a sufficiently low number of ethnic parties can sustain a collusive 
agreement with lower taxes. As the number of parties grows, it becomes more difficult to sustain 
the collusion which will lead to the suboptimal equilibrium described above. In this case ethnic 
fragmentation leads to lower growth, as it raises the probability that a collusive agreement can’t be 
maintained. 
There is a special case with one ethnic party representing the majority of the population. In this 
case, the dominant ethnic party always chooses to redistribute for itself, leading to suboptimal 
growth. The bigger share the dominant party has of the population the less distortionary the policy 
will be, as B approaches the standard case of tY, so in this case as well increasing ethnic 
homogeneity will lead to higher rates of growth. 
In contrast a dictatorship is assumed to be held in power by an ethnic army. The dictator always 
chooses the public goods to be beneficial for the supporting group. The results are similar to those 
in the case of ethnic dominance, except that now the ruling ethnic group does not have to represent 
20 
 
the majority making distortions even worse. As the ethnic fractionalization of a society grows the 
dominant ethnic group is likely to be smaller. The smaller the dominant ethnic group, the worse are 
the distortion, so ethnic fractionalization has again a negative effect on growth, and as stated above 
this negative effect is likely to be worse than in multiethnic democracies. 
There are several empirical papers, which suggest that there is a negative relationship between 
provision of public goods and ethnic fractionalization as implied by the first two models. This 
suggest that at least taken at face value the models of Alesina et al. (1999) and Miguel and Gugerty 
(2005) are more realistic. 
The same Alesina et al. (1999) paper that presents the model on ethnic fractionalization and public 
goods, also presents empirical evidence about this relationship. The empirical part studies the 
relationship between public good provision and ethnic fractionalization in US cities and counties. 
The results of the study indicate that ethnic fractionalization has negative effect on spending in 
education, roads and sewage and trash collection. The relationship is robust controlling for several 
variables, including interestingly the current level of income.  
An issue with the Alesina et al. paper is that the ethnic make-up of a community can be 
endogenous. For example it might be that areas with better provision of public goods will attract 
people with a certain ethnic make-up that might be different from the population as a whole.  
To alleviate concerns about endogeneity, the authors also instrument current ethnic fractionalization 
on ethnic fractionalization in 1979-1980. Some endogeneity concerns still remain though. The 
public goods could have already affected the ethnic composition in 1979-1980, and it is not even 
impossible to think, that the expectations of future public goods could affect this ethnic 
composition. 
The Miguel and Gugerty (2005) paper also has an empirical part. The main analysis is on school 
funding, which is organized in such a manner, that bulk of the school funding comes from the 
parents of the school children. The paper tests, whether ethnic fractionalization has an effect on 
these contributions that the parents give to the school. The finding is that higher ethnic 
fractionalization is associated with lower funding to the schools. 
The Miguel and Gugerty paper argues further that ethnic diversity leads to lower funding of the 
maintaining of community water wells in Kenya. The paper finds that empirically more diverse 
communities have water wells that are in poorer shape. 
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The paper also gives some indicative evidence that social sanctions are the reason for the lower 
provision of public goods. The paper finds that school committees in more ethnically diverse areas 
use less sanctions and give less verbal warnings to parents, who do not contribute to school 
fundraisings. 
Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) also present some evidence that ethnic fractionalization leads to a 
lower level of public goods. In this study the dependent variables were, whether Indian villages had 
access to several public goods. These public goods included schools, wells, paved roads, electricity, 
hospitals and other similar public goods. Ethnic heterogeneity in the paper is measured in terms of 
religion. Different castes within the Hindu caste system, were also considered to be different 
groups, when constructing the measure of heterogeneity. Other religions were assumed to be 
homogeneous.  
In line with other studies, there seems to be a negative relationship between heterogeneity and the 
provision of different public goods. The kind of religious fractionalization used in the study is 
different from ethnic fractionalization, which is based on language or other ethnic characteristics. 
However, if heterogeneous preferences are driving the lower provision of public goods, it might be 
that the preferences are heterogeneous among different religions or caste groups in India. 
The general problem with the endogeneity of religious fractionalization doesn’t affect this study too 
much. While it is reasonable to assume that between countries religious fractionalization is 
endogenous, as richer countries have more public goods and more freedom of religion, it is difficult 
to imagine, how religious fractionalization could be endogenous inside India. 
Bandiera and Levy (2011) present a different model on public goods and ethnic fractionalization. In 
this model ethnic fractionalization does not lead to a lower provision of public goods. Instead it 
leads to a different provision of public goods. The provision is such that it closer represents the 
interests of the elites. 
The model also ties into ethnic fractionalization’s effect on institutions, which I will discuss more in 
a later chapter. In the model ethnic fractionalization will lead to more power by the elite group, 
which means that in a sense, ethnic fractionalization will worsen the institutions of a country. 
In the model there are three groups with different preferences. One group is the majority poor 
group, other group is the elites and a third group is an ethnic minority poor group. The poor 
majority gets utility from a certain public good g. The elite also gets utility from g, but it also gets 
utility from a different public good s. The poor minority ethnic group gets utility from g and a 
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different public good e. The marginal utility from each is diminishing for all the groups. The 
majority poor group is the largest group. 
Every group is represented by a party in the political process, and none of the groups can form a 
majority on its own. The parties can form coalitions. For a coalition to be stable, no party should be 
better off by splintering in to several parties and breaking the coalition. The elite and the minority 
ethnic group can form a stable coalition, where there is some of the public good g, some s and some 
e. If the coalition breaks, the situation will revert to poor majority control with only g provided. 
This makes the coalition stable and for similar reasons the poor minority can’t join any stable 
coalition, since it would always have incentive to splinter. 
Ethnic fractionalization in this setting is equivalent to a bigger share for the poor ethnic minority 
group. The bigger this group is, the more ethnic fractionalization there is. When this group is 
sufficiently big, it can form a coalition with the elites, thus leading to more power to the elites and a 
different allocation of the public goods. 
Bandiera and Levy (2011) also empirically test this theory on Indonesian villages. Some of the 
villages are traditionally more controlled by elites, while others are more democratic. The authors 
run a regression with one independent variable being, whether the village is elite-controlled. Other 
independent variable is an interaction term between elite-controlled and the share of the minority 
population. If the signs for these two independent variables are opposite from each other, this means 
that the outcomes in ethnically diverse villages are more similar to these villages that are controlled 
by elites. The authors find that this is indeed the case, making the empirical results aligned with 
theory. 
It is not clear, how the model relates to economic well-being however. It might be that public goods 
preferred by the poor might be more conducive to development than those preferred by the elites. 
Then again, the opposite might be true as well.  
In the light of all these studies, there seems to be a robust negative link between ethnic 
fractionalization and the amount of public goods provided. The link is both theoretical and 
empirical. It remains unclear, whether this is sufficient explanation for the worse economic 
performance of more ethnically diverse countries, as there are several other factors through which 
ethnic fractionalization could affect growth even more.  
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3.3 Exploitation 
Exploitation might be relevant factor explaining, why ethnic fractionalization leads to worse 
economic development. Exploitations is always costly, so if ethnic fractionalization leads to more 
exploitation, it is plausible that this would take a toll on the economy. 
In this section I present two models that are related to exploitation by one ethnic group of other 
ethnic groups. In both models a certain ethnic group chooses to expropriate some resources for its 
own use. In this sense, these models are also related to models about ethnic fractionalization and its 
effects on institutions. As I will discuss further in the empirical section, risk of expropriation of you 
property is commonly used as a measure of institutional quality. 
Caselli and Coleman (2006) present a model of ethnic exploitation. The basic idea of the model is 
that there are natural resources that one group can capture for themselves, which will increase their 
utility. This exploitation will be costly and the members of the exploited group can join the 
dominant group with some cost. This will sometimes prevent the dominant group from exploitation. 
In the model there are two groups A and B, which have the population shares of    and   . There is 
a resource Z.    is individual income that can’t be expropriated from a person. In the case, where 
there is no exploitation, the utility of a person in the group A will be 
       
 
 
                
The model assumes that group A is a dominant group, which can also exploit the other group. In 
this case they expropriate all of Z to the members of their group. This will impose costs  , which 
are proportional to the size of the economy. Members of the group B can also join group A with 
some cost. In the case of exploitation the share of group A is   
  which is the original share of group 
A, and the additional members that join from group B. The utility for a member in group A is in the 
case of exploitation: 
   (   )(   
 
   
) 
From these, we can solve the size of   
  that causes conflict to be equilibrium. The condition is  
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The members of group B can switch to group a facing a cost . The cost is assumed to be 
proportional to their income. The members of group B will only switch, when there is exploitation. 
In the case they don’t switch their identity, they receive the utility 
   (   )   
In the case they switch their identity, they get the utility 
   (   )((   )   
 
   
) 
We can also solve for the situation, when there will be members of group B switching ethnic 
identity. In this case: 
  
   
 
 
   
   ̅ 
If    is bigger than  ̅, there is no switching. There are two scenarios with exploitation:       ̅  
 ̃, where some members of group B defect to group A and   ̅       ̃, when there is no 
switching. 
A clear implication of the model is that in a sufficiently homogenous society, there is no 
exploitation as there would be too many people dividing the spoils. As the exploitation is costly, the 
prediction is that more ethnically fractionalized societies will be poorer. 
Another consequence is that if it is not too costly to switch from one group to another, there will be 
no exploitation. The people in the exploited group would just switch their identity to the exploiting 
group. 
A different model about exploitation is presented by Collier (2000). The model contrasts the public 
policy choice by either a democracy or a dictatorship. In a dictatorship, it is possible for one group 
to exploit the other groups. This leads to a situation, where ethnic fractionalization is harmful for a 
society. In a democracy such exploitation is impossible, which leads to ethnic fractionalization 
having no effect on the public policy choices. 
The model is a two stage model, where the welfare of the median voter is determined by the 
following equation: 
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where Y is income in period 1, t is the tax-rate, B is the benefits of public expenditure and g(t) is the 
growth rate. The growth rate is assumed to be a diminishing function of taxes. 
Assuming that public expenditure equals its cost and that the budget is balanced, then  
                  (   ( ))      
A democracy is assumed as usual to maximize the welfare of a median voter, so the maximized 
function is the following: 
    (   )                
(   )(   ( ))         (   ( ))     
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As the median income is always less than the mean income, the tax rate is positive and the growth is 
less than it could be.  
According to the model in a democracy, ethnic diversity does not affect growth or the effect is 
indeterminate. In a democracy the benefits have to be distributed equally to all citizens. The model 
assumes that people vote for parties along ethnic lines. If income is related to ethnicity, the level of 
taxes is determined by median voter in the median income ethnic group. If there are a lot of ethnic 
groups the median voter in the median ethnic group is the same as the median voter in the economy 
in general. With less ethnic groups the median voter in a certain ethnic group might be richer or 
poorer than the median voter in the economy, so the effect on taxes in this case is indeterminate. 
If ethnicity is unrelated to income, then the median income determines the level of taxation no 
matter what, since every ethnic party maximizes the welfare for a median income voter. So the 
result is the same as in the case, where ethnic fractionalization is irrelevant. 
In a dictatorship the public policy choices are made in a very different manner. The model assumes 
that in a dictatorship, the dictator stays in power supported by an army composed of one ethnic 
group. The dictator doesn’t have to share the benefits equally, so the benefits are only given to the 
ethnic group supporting the dictator. The dictator has to satisfy the median voter of the supporting 
ethnic group, as otherwise he would risk a coup. The dictator maximizes the following function: 
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where n is the percentage share of the ethnic group supporting the dictator in the population. Clearly 
the taxes are higher than in a democracy, if n<100. The smaller the ruling ethnic group, the higher 
the taxes. Clearly in a more ethnically diverse society, it is likely that the ruling ethnic group will be 
smaller, leading to worse distortionary taxes. 
The dictatorship’s ability to raise taxes is also diminished by a chance of revolution by the other 
ethnic groups. The model claims that the chance of a revolution diminishes the more ethnic groups 
there are, as the revolution is sort of a public good, with the benefits shared by all ethnic groups, 
while the costs are incurred by individuals
4
. Higher ethnic diversity therefore diminishes the 
chances of a revolution, which leads to higher taxes and therefore slower growth. 
The theory assumes that ethnic fractionalization has a different effect in democracies and 
dictatorships. The Collier (2000) paper that presents this model, also gives some empirical evidence 
of this claiming this to be evidence supporting the theory. This empirical evidence was already 
presented in the earlier section. However, there are several other reasons, why ethnic 
fractionalization might affect democracies and dictatorships in a different manner, so it is not clear 
that the mechanisms of this model are the ones driving this effect. 
The model is obviously meant to be unrealistic, so all its empirical implications should not be taken 
too seriously. The model does imply that under any circumstances, dictatorships have slower 
growth than democracies. The empirical evidence can’t find that autocracy affects growth in either 
positive or negative manner (see for example Easterly 2011). This model is probably then too 
unrealistic to be considered as a basis for ethnic fractionalizations negative effect on growth. 
In general, it is difficult to find direct empirical evidence for either of these models. The Caselli and 
Coleman (2006) paper presents some anecdotal evidence supporting the theory. While it is difficult 
to find empirical evidence, both models especially the Caselli and Coleman model seem plausible, 
so further investigation on the area seems warranted.  
 
3.4 Civil War 
Civil war might be related to ethnic fractionalization as is shown in the following models. It is 
reasonable to assume that civil wars hinder the development of a country and lead to lower per 
                                                          
4
 This is a feature of the model that is not exactly supported by empirical evidence. The next section presents 
empirical evidence of civil war and there is no paper that finds that ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to the 
probability of a revolution. 
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capita income or at least slower economic growth. It is therefore important to study the link 
between civil war and ethnic fractionalization as civil wars might be the mechanism, which cause 
ethnically fractioned societies to be poorer. 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) present a model on civil war, where the likelihood of civil war is based 
on the incentives faced by the potential rebels. The rebels face the following utility function in the 
case of war, which determines, whether the potential payoff for civil war exceeds its costs: 
   ∫
 ( )   (   )
(   ) 
  
 
   
 ∫
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(   ) 
  
   
   
 
p(T) stands for the probability of the rebels winning. It is a diminishing function of taxable base T, 
as the bigger the taxable base is the better equipment government can afford to buy to defend itself 
from the rebels. G(T,P) is for gains for the rebels in the case of victory. The gains are a positive 
function of the taxable base. The gains also positively depend on the size of the population P. This 
is based on the fact that higher population might lead to bigger gains in the case of secession. This 
is because the rebelling group might occupy an area, which is well-endowed with resources and in 
the case of secession it would not have to redistribute the resources to such a big group. 
The costs of the rebellion are determined by f(Y) and C. The costs are an increasing function of 
income Y, as a rebellion is work intensive. The higher the income the more valuable is your time 
and the more appealing are alternatives to rebellion. C stands for costs of communication. The 
rebels need to communicate with each other and this communication needs to be kept secret from 
the government. This is costly. 
In this model ethnic fractionalization is related to the costs of communication. The authors assume 
that information flows more freely inside an ethnic group. The paper hypothesizes that the costs of 
communication are lowest, when a country is dominated by two ethnic groups, one of which is the 
one associated with the government. A more homogenous country makes costs of communication 
for the rebels more expensive, as it is more difficult to keep communication secret from the 
government. Communication is also costly in an ethnically highly diverse society as it is costly to 
communicate between all the different ethnic groups. The paper then predicts an inverse-U shaped 
relationship between ethnic diversity and civil war. 
If this model is to be believed ethnic fractionalization as such doesn’t lead to a higher probability of 
civil war, as the probability of civil war is the highest at the middle-levels of ethnic 
fractionalization. Thus, even if true, the model cannot explain, why more ethnic fractionalization 
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has been associated with lower growth in per capita income, except in a subsample of countries that 
are at the lower end of ethnic fractionalization. 
In this model ethnic fractionalization is only related to civil war through costs of communication. It 
is not completely clear, how institutional context would be relevant in a setting like this. It might be 
that in a less democratic society, keeping communication secret might be more difficult, making the 
cost of communication a more relevant issue. 
Another model on civil war is presented by Chacón et al. (2006). In the model the sizes of 
competing political groups determine, whether the groups will try to gain power by winning an 
election or through violence. If the competing political groups are ethnic in nature, the model yields 
predictions about how the likelihood of ethnic violence changes, when the relative sizes of the 
ethnic groups change. 
In the model there are two groups, which can choose to compete for power by elections or by 
waging war. The basic prediction of the model is that the likelihood of violence is largest when the 
two groups are similar in size. In a situation, when one group is dominant, the group will have a 
very high chance of winning an election. The smaller group will not want to contest this because 
they will also have a low probability of winning, when there is fighting. On the other hand, when 
the groups are of similar size, the group that loses the election still has incentive to start fighting, as 
it has a high probability of winning the fighting, as the groups are similar in size.  
In the simplified context of this model, the likelihood of violence is bigger, when ethnic 
fractionalization is higher, which in the case of two groups means a situation, where the two groups 
are of similar size. It is not clear however, how this model generalizes to a situation, when there are 
more than two groups fighting for power. 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) also present an empirical investigation of their theory of civil war. The 
authors’ dependent variables are the probability of occurrence of a civil war and the duration of the 
civil war. The data on ethnic fractionalization comes from the Atlas Narodov Mira. 
The results for the regression on the duration of the civil war are similar to those predicted by their 
model. Ethnic fractionalization and ethnic fractionalization squared are significant at explaining the 
duration of the civil war. As predicted by their model the duration of the civil war seems to be 
longest at the middle levels of ethnic fractionalization which basically corresponds to the situation 
with two ethnic groups of equal sizes. The results from the probit-regression on the probability of 
civil war are similar to those in the regression for the duration. However, now neither ethnic 
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fractionalization nor ethnic fractionalization squared is a significant explanatory variable. The 
coefficients are however very similar to those in the regression for the duration of the civil war.  
The results are also in line with Chacón et al. (2006) as the likelihood of war is the highest, with 
two equally sized groups. Obviously, this depends on how the model works in the situation of 
multiple groups. 
Chacón et al. (2006) also presents empirical evidence of its own, although the contesting political 
groups are not ethnic in their empirical analysis. Instead the two groups are conservatives and 
liberals in Colombia. The paper finds that in 1946-1950, the probability of violent fighting between 
the two political groups was highest, when the support in the preceding election was equal for the 
two groups and less likely, when one group was dominant.   
Fearon and Laitlin (2003) also empirically study the link between ethnic fractionalization and civil 
war. The main finding related to ethnic fractionalization is that, when controlling for income, higher 
ethnic fractionalization is not associated with civil war.  
The paper also classifies some civil wars as ethnic civil wars. In these civil wars, ethnicity is a 
major dividing line between the different warring factions. Even in this case higher ethnic 
fractionalization is not related to a higher likelihood of war.  
If the results of the Fearon and Laitlin (2003) study are to be taken seriously, the only way ethnic 
fractionalization might affect the probability of civil war, is through its effect on GDP. The usual 
problem of endogeneity applies, as income is endogenous with respect to civil war and with respect 
to ethnic fractionalization. Even expected civil war might affect income, as it might foe example 
cause human capital to leave the country. 
The Fearon and Laitlin (2003) paper however doesn’t take into account the fact that the relationship 
between civil war and ethnic fractionalization might be non-linear. Both theoretical and empirical 
reasons presented earlier seem to suggest that the most relevant measure might be ethnic 
fractionalization squared. 
Another Collier and Hoeffler (2004) paper presents a model of a civil war from a slightly different 
perspective. The main driving force in the previous model was the cost of the civil war, which was 
compared to the benefits of the winning the war. The later paper takes into account the fact that 
civil wars might be financed during the war, thus making them less costly. Possible mechanisms for 
this include financing from diasporas, money from hostile governments and natural resources 
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extorted from the rebel-controlled areas. The paper also considers the possibility that civil war 
might be motivated by grievances against the rulers, instead of just economic motives by the rebels. 
Ethnic fractionalization is again related to the costs of the rebellion. A more diverse rebel group is 
less socially coherent, so a more diverse army will function worse. This would actually suggest that 
civil war is less likely in ethnically diverse countries, as the pool to recruit soldiers from becomes 
smaller for any particular rebel group, as the soldiers need to be recruited from the same ethnic 
group as the rebels.  
If instead the reason for a civil war is grievances instead of economic opportunities ethnic 
fractionalization might have a positive effect on the likelihood of a civil war. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) state that there might be some psychologically based hatred, if the ruling group is from a 
different ethnic group than the potential rebels. In this case, more ethnic fractionalization leads to 
higher probability that the ruling elite is from a different group. 
If grievances are actually the reason for civil wars, it is easy to see, why ethnic fractionalization 
might lead to a higher chance of civil war in a context, where institutions are worse. If one ethnic 
group dominates the politics of the country, this domination will probably lead to much worse 
repression of the other ethnic groups under worse institutions, almost by definition. In this case, it 
would seem likely that ethnic fractionalization affects the likelihood of civil war more, when the 
institutions are worse.  
The Collier and Hoeffler paper that presents this theory also empirically tests for the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization on civil war. The variable for ethnic fractionalization is significant and has a 
positive effect on the likelihood of a civil war in some regressions, but it is not significant in most. 
A measure for social fractionalization, which is a combined measure of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization, is negative in most regression and usually not significant. All and all the results 
don’t suggest that there is a strong link between ethnic fractionalization and civil war. 
A paper by Easterly et al. (2006) tackles a related question of mass killings, where a larger amount 
of people were killed by the state in a situation not related to a civil war. If mass killings are related 
to ethnic fractionalization, this would suggest that the relevant mechanism between ethnic 
fractionalization and civil wars is grievances. It doesn’t seem likely that there exists an 
economically self-interested reason for mass killings. 
Ethnic fractionalization and ethnic fractionalization squared are significant at explaining the 
probability of mass killings, with the highest probability of mass killings occurring at middle levels 
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of ethnic fractionalization. There is however no relationship between ethnic fractionalization and 
the intensity of the mass killings only their probability. This suggests that grievances might really 
be an important part of why ethnic fractionalization might cause civil wars.  
The Easterly et al. (2006) paper also raises the possibility of reverse causality between civil war and 
ethnic fractionalization. If one ethnic group is persecuted in during a civil war, they are more likely 
to leave the country. Also, if the people killed belong predominantly to one ethnic group, the share 
of this group diminishes. So in both cases, ethnic fractionalization might actually diminish because 
of the civil war. Ethnic fractionalization might also diminish before the civil war, if anticipation of 
the war causes one group to leave the country. All of these mechanisms might bias the results 
against finding a link between civil war and ethnic fractionalization.  
In conclusion, the link between ethnic fractionalization and civil war seems to be weak. The link 
between the two is not very strong theoretically. Empirical results suggesting this link are 
ambivalent at best and there are a lot of results suggesting that there is no link at all. It is more 
likely that civil wars are associated with a squared measure of ethnic fractionalization, but even this 
is not robustly proven by the empirical investigations discussed in this paper. This leads me to 
conclude that the link between ethnic fractionalization and poor economic performance is probably 
not through civil war. 
 
3.5 Social Capital 
The usual measure of social capital is trust. It seems likely that lower trust in a society leads to a 
lower level of per capita income. Trust might for example make people trade less with each other 
leading to unrealized gains from trade. Lower trust might also lead to a lower level of provision of 
public goods, make grievances worse, which increases to likelihood of civil war, and affect the 
public policy choices of the government.  
There is empirical evidence that trust leads to lower GDP growth, which suggest that if ethnic 
fractionalization indeed affects trust it also affects economic well-being. Knack and Keefer (1997) 
finds that higher trust is associated with higher GDP growth. Trust is measured based on surveys in 
which people tell, whether they trust other people. High fraction of trusting people is associated 
with higher GDP growth and this relationship is statistically significant.  
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The paper also provides some evidence that the relationship is causal. According to the paper higher 
trust is related to faster subsequent economic growth, so trust seems to be a leading indicator. 
Changes in trust are also not correlated with changes in GDP. 
One paper about social capital in ethnically fractionalized society is Fearon and Laitlin (1996). The 
paper presents a model on interethnic cooperation, where such cooperation sometimes breaks down. 
In the model, there are two equilibria in which the different ethnic groups trust each other. There is 
also a possibility of an equilibrium, in which members of different ethnic groups don’t trust each 
other, which leads to a situation in which the members of the different ethnic groups don’t 
cooperate. Cooperation in this model might, for example, mean trading with each other. 
The starting point of the model is a matching game, where two individuals are randomly matched. 
When people are matched they can either cooperate or defect, in a prisoner’s dilemma fashion, 
where cooperation leads to highest combined pay-offs, but defection is the dominant strategy in 
interactions that are repeated only once. As usual, repeated interaction with any two people 
mitigates the problem of defection, as the negative pay-offs from cheating get worse, as you lose 
benefits from the future interaction. 
If contact with any two people is infrequent enough, the lost benefits of cooperating might be too 
small and cooperation could break down. If a person interacts with a lot of people, it is not 
necessary to cooperate with any of them, as any particular person become less important. The 
existence of ethnic groups mitigates this, as information is shared within ethnic groups, which can 
lead to punishment of cheaters. 
This situation might lead to three possible equilibria within an ethnic group. First of all, there might 
be an equilibrium, where nobody cooperates. Secondly, there might be an equilibrium, where 
everybody cooperates and once someone defects, everybody moves to the first equilibrium with no 
cooperation. In the third case, cheaters are punished for a certain period. 
In the case of several ethnic groups, the cheater from a different ethnic group can’t be punished 
individually since he cannot be recognized within the ethnic group doesn’t belong in. There are now 
two ways to sustain interethnic cooperation. Either the whole group gets punished by the cheating 
of one person. This would lead to escalation and breaking down of cooperation between the two 
ethnic groups. Fear of this escalation leads to cooperation. 
The other cooperative equilibrium is where the cheating by a different ethnic group is ignored. In 
this case the ethnic group of the cheater is expected to punish the cheater for a certain period. This 
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equilibrium is again enforced by the fear of breakdown of trust between the ethnic groups, in which 
case there would be unrealized gains from trade.  
Both equilibria will break down, if there is too frequent contact between the ethnic groups, as in that 
case there is no reason to cooperate within your own group, as you can instead transact with the 
other ethnic group and you own group becomes lot less necessary for you. 
The equilibrium with escalation between groups is not robust with noise. If players accidentally 
sometimes defect the equilibrium will break down. Anticipating the breakdown of the equilibrium 
makes defection a good strategy during any round. There is no point in cooperating, if there is 
always going to be a breakdown of trust in any scenario. Even if there is tolerance for some amount 
of defections, noise will break down the equilibrium, as now it is beneficial to abuse the tolerance 
for defection and always defect. 
Smaller groups can’t use the fear of escalation as a deterrent for cheating, so they have a strong 
incentive to develop within group policing mechanisms. Big ethnic groups don’t have much 
incentive to cooperate in either equilibrium. That would in a sense imply that ethnic 
fractionalization would cause the most problems at the middle-level of ethnic fractionalization. 
With a lot of ethnic fractionalization, all groups are small, so they have incentive to develop these 
group policing mechanisms. With very large ethnic groups there aren’t as many opportunities for 
trust to break down. In countries with several medium-sized ethnic groups there are more 
possibilities for the trust to break down, which leads to a prediction that there is less trust in more 
heterogeneous countries up to a certain point. 
The institutional context is relevant here as well. It might be that trust is more significant for 
economic development in countries with worse institutional development. For example it might be 
that well function courts replace the role that trust plays in societies with no well-functioning courts. 
This would lead to a prediction that ethnic fractionalization is more harmful in societies with worse 
institutions, as trust plays a bigger role in those societies. 
Another model about ethnic fractionalization and trust is presented by Leeson (2005). In the model, 
diminishing the ethnic distance between two people, by for example learning each other’s language 
increases trust. This implies that increased ethnic homogeneity is associated with increased trust, 
although neither might actually be the cause of the other. The model also implies that institutions 
might increase ethnic heterogeneity and decrease trust. If the model is true and institutions affect 
ethnic fractionalization, this will present problems later in the thesis, in the empirical section, as it 
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makes more difficult to determine which channels are causal. Leeson’s model is developed 
especially in context of African ethnic institutions and the effect of colonialism on these 
institutions. 
In the model the amount of trading that occurs is determined by, whether agents can signal their 
reliability. People, with short-term time-preferences are more are inclined to cheat as the gains of 
cheating overweight the possibilities of future co-operation for them. People, who discount future 
less, make more reliable trading partners, so it is important to distinguish the two. Preferably there 
needs to be a signal which is cheap for co-operators and expensive for cheaters. 
Measures that reduce the ethnic distance between trading partners, such as learning each other’s 
language or adopting other’s religion, might be a good way to signal your trustworthiness. The 
benefits of such measures are necessarily long-term as the usefulness of such measures increases 
with repeated contact. 
Certain institutions might break these signals and therefore lead to lesser trade, more ethnic 
fractionalization and lower GDP. For example, if a colonial administration has a preference toward 
certain language or religion, adopting the language or religion doesn’t signal trustworthiness 
anymore. It might instead only tell about a person responding to incentives towards adopting a 
certain language or religion. 
One could imagine that in this scenario, there would be new signals that would have been 
developed to replace to older ones.  However, there are two reasons, why this is not the case. First 
of all, developing these signals might take time and in the intervening period trade is less frequent 
and subsequently growth slows down. Other reason is that the new signals might be too expensive. 
There is a reason, why the initial signals were chosen, and this is probably because these signals 
were the cheapest ones. 
The link between ethnic fractionalization and trust has also been studied empirically. The Knack 
and Keefer (1997) study mentioned earlier also empirically investigates, what are the possible 
causes for some countries having higher trust than other. The study finds that countries that are 
more ethnically homogenous are more trusting.  
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) empirically study the determinants of trust in different cities and 
counties in the US. The study is based on surveys documenting individual attitudes on whether 
people trust each other. The surveys also include variety of other information regarding 
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characteristics of the respondents, including ethnic group, making it possible to study, whether 
ethnic fractionalization is related to trust. 
The paper constructs an index of the racial heterogeneity in different areas and includes this as one 
of the possible explanatory variables explaining trust. The result is that racial heterogeneity reduces 
trust. Obviously there is a lot of mobility between different areas in the US. It might be that through 
some mechanism the more trusting people move out of the racially heterogeneous areas or that, 
somehow, less trusting areas attract a more diverse populations. While this is possible, it is difficult 
to imagine mechanisms on how something like this could happen. 
Glaeser et al. (1999) experimentally study the determinants of trust. The experiment was performed 
on Harvard undergraduates. In the experiment the first player could give an amount between 0 and 
15 dollars to the second player. The experimenter then added a matching amount of to the sum, 
which was then given to second player, who thus got two times the first players contribution. The 
second player could then return as much money as he wanted to the first player. In some versions of 
the game the second player could also promise to return at least as much money, as the first player 
had originally contributed. 
The amount of money the first player decides to give is used to measure trust. The amount the 
second player decides to send is a measure of trustworthiness. As expected, if the players belonged 
to a different ethnic group, the first player was less trusting. However the effect is not quite 
statistically significant. The fact that players belonged to different ethnic groups was however 
statistically significantly and negatively related to the trustworthiness of the second player. The 
study thus gives some evidence, that ethnic fractionalization at least might have a negative effect on 
trust in a society or the very least a negative effect on some sort of social capital. 
The authors also administered surveys, similar to those in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Alesina and 
La Ferrara (2002). The people who were more trusting in surveys were not more trusting in the 
experiments. This raises questions about relevance of studies based on these kinds of surveys. The 
answers to the surveys did however predict the trustworthiness of the people, so that the people 
claiming to be more trusting were actually more trustworthy. If these answers to survey questions 
do indeed measure trustworthiness, the Knack and Keefer (1997) results about economic growth 
might indicate that trustworthiness is related to economic growth. After all, the survey question did 
have a relationship with economic growth and trustworthiness, but not so much trust. 
36 
 
While there are valid theoretical reasons to assume that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect 
on trust and while there is also some empirical indication of this, there is still reasonable doubt, 
whether this is in fact a robust relationship. It is not clear that surveys are a good measure of trust 
and it also seems that experimental evidence can’t confirm that people trust other people who 
belong to a different ethnic group less. The evidence also seems to indicate that ethnic 
fractionalization is more important for trustworthiness, which might also be an important facet of 
social capital that affects growth. 
Another commonly used indicator for social capital, besides trust, is participation in various social 
groups in the community, such as church groups or professional associations. There is also some 
empirical and theoretical evidence that ethnic fractionalization affects group participation in a 
negative manner.  
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) present a model of how racial heterogeneity affects participation in 
clubs. In the model there are two different racial groups, which gain utility from joining a club. The 
utility from joining a club is lower the more there are people from the other group and the further 
the individual distance from the club is. People are also heterogeneous with respect to their aversion 
to having people from the other group join the club. 
In the case that there is only one club in the society, there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium 
only one group participates in the club and in other equilibrium the club is a mixed club. In the case 
that there is a mixed group, the fraction of the minority in the club is lower than the fraction of the 
minority group in the society. Individuals in the minority that are only slightly averse to diversity 
don’t want to join the group, as there are so many members of the other group. On the other hand, 
even individuals from the majority group that are very averse to heterogeneity feel comfortable 
joining the group, as there aren’t that many members of the minority group. This leads to the 
situation, where the minority group is underrepresented. 
When there are two racial groups heterogeneity is largest, when the shares of the groups are equal. 
If we move towards more heterogeneity participation in the club diminishes. If the club is not 
mixed, the lower the share of the majority group, the less there are people to participate in the 
homogeneous group. If the group is mixed, lowering the share of majority group leads to bigger 
decrease in individuals from the majority group, who don’t participate than the increase from the 
minority group, who now will participate. This is based on the fact that the majority group will 
always be overrepresented in the club. 
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The implications of the model are basically similar, if there are more groups. In the case of mixed 
groups, all the groups will be of similar size and the same logic that applies to one group applies to 
all of these groups. 
The Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) paper also has an empirical part, that studies group participation 
in different US cities. The basic finding is in line with the model and it is found that probability of 
individuals joining some community group is lower in cities with more heterogeneity. The 
probability is lower for groups, where there is lots of interaction between the participants such as a 
church group than for groups for which there is not, such as professional associations. This suggests 
that the participation is driven by dislike for heterogeneity as assumed by the model. 
A problem with the study is that heterogeneity is correlated with other variables, such as income 
inequality. The paper notes that running a regression with two measures of heterogeneity (racial 
fractionalization and ethnic fractionalization, which is based on the country of origin) and Gini-
index, only the Gini-index is statistically significant. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that ethnic 
heterogeneity doesn’t affect group participation while income inequality does. 
Overall there are reasons to suspect that ethnic fractionalization is related to social capital at least in 
some ways. Depending on, how important social capital actually is for the society this might be a 
major reason, why ethnic fractionalization is related to worse economic performance in some 
societies. 
 
3.6 Institutions 
There exists both theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting the fact that ethnic fractionalization 
also has an effect on the institutions. This presents problems on the study of how institutional 
context affects the economic consequences of ethnic fractionalization. It is already likely that 
institutions affect economic development and that economic development affects institutions. Now 
also ethnic fractionalization affects institutions and ethnic fractionalization affects economic 
development differently with different institutions. Because of all of these linkages, it raises 
questions about, whether it is possible to find causal effects in relation to these three variables. I 
will discuss this further in my empirical section and in this section just demonstrate the theoretical 
and empirical links that link ethnic fractionalization to institutional quality. 
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Aghion et al. (2004) present a model of endogenous political institutions. The model is concerned, 
with the choice of how insulated the political leader is, which is measured in terms of, how big a 
majority the political leader needs to implement reform. The reform will benefit some part of the 
electorate and there is also a chance, that the elected leader will expropriate property from the 
electorate. 
When choosing the size of the majority needed to pass reforms, the electorate has a trade-off 
between two things: if the required majority is large, even beneficial reforms will not be 
implemented, as even a small amount of people, who would lose from the changes would be able to 
block the reform. On the other hand, if the majority required is large, then the leader that wants to 
expropriate property can be more easily blocked. Clearly this leads to a function for the required 
majority that is increasing in the probability of bad leaders and the amount of property in the society 
than can be expropriated. It is a decreasing function of the usual benefits from the reform. 
The political system develops differently, if the political process is initially controlled by some elite 
that is distinct from other people. When choosing institutional constraints the elite will choose 
differently than the population in general. If this elite will think they won’t control the political 
process in the future, it makes sense for them to make the political leaders more insulated meaning 
that their decisions are less easily blocked by other branches of the government. The elite will be 
people, who benefit more from the reforms
5
. As explained in the previous paragraph the required 
majority is a decreasing function of the benefits from reform, so if the choice of majority is made by 
those, who benefit from the reform, they will impose lower required majority by the leader to make 
her decisions. 
The way this ties into ethnic fractionalization is that it can be assumed and the authors do assume 
that with a more ethnically fractionalized society, it is more likely that there will be a politically 
dominant group that is different from everybody else.  
Aghion et al. (2004) also present empirical evidence that higher ethnic fractionalization is 
associated with more insulated political leaders meaning political leaders. The paper employs, as a 
dependent variable, several measures of insulation: whether country is democratic or not, as 
dictatorship are more insulated, whether country has a presidential or a parliamentary system, where 
presidential system is assumed to be more insulated, and whether the system is more winner-take-
                                                          
5
 In the paper the elite group is the group most benefiting from changes by definition. It makes sense 
that those, who control the political process will benefit more from changes 
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all, which again is assumed to be a more insulated system. The finding is that with every measure of 
insulation, higher ethnic fractionalization is associated with more insulation.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) present an industrial organization type of model about corruption. They 
link corruption to ethnic fractionalization and show that bribes might be lower in an ethnically more 
homogenous society. 
According to the model collusive corrupt bureaucrats demand less bribes than bureaucrats acting on 
their own, if different permits that the bureaucrats sell are complements. The basic intuition is 
simple, as the collusive bureaucrats take in to consideration the effects of the demand for other 
permits, when considering the price for the permits and charge less to make the complementary 
permits more attractive. 
As lower bribes in general are better for the economy, the countries with collusive public workers 
tend to perform better than countries with public workers acting on their own. The authors speculate 
that ethnic homogeneity might make the public officials more collusive. The logic is that it easier to 
supervise different public workers that might deviate from the collusive agreement, as information 
flows more freely through family and kin connections, which are precipitated by ethnic 
homogeneity. 
An empirical paper on ethnic fractionalization and corruption Mauro (1995) finds an empirical link 
between ethnic fractionalization and corruption. As usual, it not clear that the link is causal, as 
corruption is highly correlated with other measures of institutions, as different kinds of bad 
institutions go hand in hand. It might be that ethnic fractionalization worsens institutional quality in 
general. Also corruption might be higher in ethnically diverse societies just due to the reason that 
they are poorer. 
Mauro (1995) studies the link between ethnic fractionalization and a more comprehensive measure 
of institutional quality. The paper constructs an index for bureaucratic efficiency by averaging 
measures of red tape, corruption and a measure for the integrity of the judiciary system. There is a 
negative relationship with bureaucratic efficiency and ethnic fractionalization. 
La Porta et al. (1999) studies a wide range of measures for the quality of government. The paper 
empirically measures, whether ethnic fractionalization is connected to these variables. According to 
the study higher ethnic fragmentation is linked to lower protection for property rights, more 
bureaucratic delays, less tax compliance, higher infant mortality, worse quality of infrastructure and 
lower school attainment and again more corruption. The countries with more ethnic 
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fractionalization also have more state enterprises and less political freedom. Interestingly the 
countries with higher ethnic fractionalization have less transfers of income, lower public 
consumption and less public employment. 
In the study the effect of ethnic fractionalization on institutions is not significant, when controlling 
for income. This makes it very questionable, whether the link between bad institutions and ethnic 
fractionalization is causal. A plausible explanation is that ethnic fractionalization causes countries 
to be poorer and this in turn negatively affects institutions. This is an especially plausible 
interpretation in the light of the fact that La Porta et al. (1999) do not provide any strong theoretical 
link between ethnic fractionalization and these particular measures of quality of government. 
Another paper studying the determinants of quality of government is Alesina and Zhuravskaya 
(2011), which empirically studies the link between ethnic segregation and the quality of 
government. The paper constructs an index of ethnic segregation, where the index takes the value of 
1, if every ethnic group lives in a completely homogenous area with no other ethnic groups. The 
index takes the value of 0, if the ethnic composition of each area is the same as the ethnic 
composition of the country as a whole.  
The paper uses World Bank’s The Worldwide Governance Indicators as a measure of the quality of 
the government. The paper finds that ethnic segregation has a negative link with every aspect of the 
quality of the government. Ethnic segregation also has a negative effect on trust and positive affect 
on the probability of ethnic parties. 
Interestingly, when using only the subsample of democracies the link between ethnic segregation 
and quality of government is stronger. This seems to suggest that somehow ethnic segregation is 
more harmful in democracies.  
When trust is controlled for in a regression explaining the quality of government, the coefficient for 
ethnic segregation goes down. This suggests that the mechanism causing ethnic segregation to 
lower the quality of government might be trust.  
The paper also instruments for ethnic segregation by using the existence of the same ethnic group in 
a neighboring country as an instrument for the location of ethnic groups inside the country. The idea 
is that, if an ethnic group exists at the neighboring country, the same ethnic group is likely reside at 
the border of these two countries. The results are robust for using instrumental variables, which 
gives credence to the interpretation that the relationship is causal. It is still quite possible that ethnic 
segregation affects institutions through GDP per capita or some other variable. 
41 
 
Similarly to Alesina et al. (2012), the Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) paper tells that just focusing 
on ethnic fractionalization does not tell the whole story about ethnicity’s effect on different 
countries. It should be kept in mind that there is more to the story. 
While there are some theoretical reasons to think that ethnic fractionalization has a detrimental 
effect on institutions, the empirical evidence is not clear-cut. The evidence suffers for the problem 
that is very common for empirical investigations like the ones presented in this section. Bad things 
in an economy tend to be highly correlated, so it not clear, which are the causal mechanisms 
through which the effects of ethnic fractionalization go through. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
As seen in this section, there are several possible ways, in which institutions are relevant for the 
effects of ethnic fractionalization to a society. Table 3 summarizes the ways in which institutional 
context can exacerbate the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization.  
It is clear that, there are different kinds of institutional contexts that might be relevant. In some 
cases, it is relevant, whether the citizens of a country can freely vote, in others it is relevant, 
whether the property rights are secure. It might even be relevant, how well developed the insurance 
and other market like this are. 
The general tendency is that more “modern” institutional contexts lessen the negative effects of 
ethnic fractionalization. The more free people are, the more secure their property rights and the 
more developed the markets are, less harmful ethnic fractionalization is. 
Because it is not clear, what are the relevant institutions, I will use several different measures for 
institutional quality in my empirical section that follows. 
 
 
 
Mechanism Relevance Explanation 
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Different institutions take the 
preferences of the voters into 
account to a different extent Public goods 
Ethnic fractionalization might affect the 
amount of public goods demanded by the 
median voter. In less democratic context, the 
opinion of the median voter is less relevant. 
Social sanctions might be less 
effecive in modern institutional 
contexts. Public goods 
Social sanctions are more effective, when 
people rely on, for example, traditional forms 
of insurance. With some institutions ethnic 
fractionalization can't affect as much through 
social sanctions. 
Taxation can be used to 
redistribute income to one 
ethnic group in a dictatorship. 
Exploitation/Public 
goods 
In a more dictatorial context, taxation yields 
larger benefits, as the benefits can be 
distributed among a small group. In a more 
democratic context, the income from taxation 
has to be distributed among a larger group. 
Dictator might be held in power 
by an ethnic army. Exploitation 
A dictator might be held in power by an 
ethnic army. Therefore in a dictatorial 
context, ethnic fractionalization is more 
harmful as the benefits will be distributed to a 
smaller group. 
In less democratic contexts, cost 
of communication is more 
relevant. Civil War 
Communication among rebels is costly at very 
low or very high levels of ethnic 
fractionalization making middle level of ethnic 
fractionalization most likely setting for civil 
war. Under less democratic settings the cost 
of communication might be more relevant. 
Grievances are worse under 
dictatorships. Civil War 
Civil war might be more likely, if one groups 
feels they are treated badly. If the 
beneficiaries and victoms of a dictator are 
from a different ethnic group the grievances 
migh get worse. 
Certain institutions make trust 
less necessary Social capital 
Some institutions, such as well functioning 
judicial system make trust less necessary as 
contracts can be better enforced. 
Table 3: Summary of ways in which institutional context affects the effects of ethnic fractionalization. 
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4. Empirical Investigation 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of the empirical part of this thesis is to test, whether good institutions really 
diminish the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization on long-term economic well-being. There 
are several ways in which I will investigate this hypothesis. 
The basic strategy is to run a regression with institutions, ethnic fractionalization and an interaction 
term between the two as explanatory variables. I will use several dependent variables, which 
measure economic outcomes. I will elaborate on this in the data section. 
My empirical strategy is threefold. First I will run regressions similar to those of Easterly (2001) 
and Collier (2000) using a different sample of countries and a different dependent variable, as my 
interest is in the long-term economic development. Instead of growth, I use the level of GDP per 
capita. However to compare my results to these studies, I also run a regression with GDP growth as 
the dependent variable. 
My sample consists of countries previously colonized by Europeans. The reason for this is that, I 
can later instrument for institutions and also, there is some reason to suspect that some institutions 
are more exogenous in these countries, as they are likely to reflect colonially transplanted 
institutions. If the results of Easterly (2001) and Collier (2000) are indeed robust, they should hold 
in a different sample of countries and possibly also for the level of GDP per capita. 
A problem with previous studies of this type was the endogeneity of institutions. While institutions 
might affect current economic outcomes, current economic outcomes might affect institutions as 
well. There are two basic strategies, which I will try to take this into account. 
My first way of doing this, is by using measures of institutions that are less subject to change. 
Following La Porta et al. (2003) I consider the relevant institutions be measures of judicial 
independence and judicial review of constitution. According to La Porta et al. (2003) these 
measures change much more slowly and are thus less dependent on current income. Again 
according to La Porta et al. (2003), there is evidence that these measures reflect colonially 
transplanted institutions, so it is probable that in my subsample of former colonies these measures 
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of institutions are not endogenous. I will discuss these institutional measures in more detail in a 
later section. 
I will also try to reduce the problem of endogeneity by using an instrument for the quality of 
institutions. Following Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), I use the settler mortality on 
former colonial countries as an instrument for the quality of institutions.  
The basic idea for this instrument is that settler mortality affected, how many Europeans moved to a 
colony. In colonies with a lot of Europeans, the colonial powers set up institutions that were similar 
to those in Europe. In colonies with few Europeans the main purpose of the institutions was the 
extraction resources from these countries and for that reason, the colonial powers established worse 
institutions with, for example, weaker protection of property rights. Acemoglu, Johson and 
Robinson also find that there is a correlation between current and past institutional quality. The 
institutions seem to be highly persistent, with former colonies inheriting the colonial institutions. 
This is a reason, why settler mortality affects current institutions. 
 
4.2 The Data 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
As the main dependent variable I use World Bank I use are logarithm of GDP per capita in 2010. I 
will also study changes in GDP per capita from 1996 to 2005. The data for both of these comes 
from the World Bank. Current GDP per capita is a comprehensive measure for the current economic 
well-being of the country. Using level of GDP per capita also makes my study more comparable 
with Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), which is the basis for my study. Using also changes 
as the dependent variable makes my study more comparable to previous studies of ethnic 
fractionalization and growth, as most of these studies were concerned with changes in GDP per 
capita. 
To check for robustness another dependent variable that I use, is logarithm of infant mortality in 
2010 following the lead of Ahlerup (2009). The measure of infant mortality is infant deaths per 
1000 live births. This data comes from World Development Indicators dataset, collected by the 
World Bank. The motivation to use infant mortality as a robustness check is that measures of infant 
mortality are highly negatively correlated with GDP per capita. GDP per capita might not be 
precisely measured, especially in the former colonies that comprise the dataset. It is possible that 
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infant mortality is more precisely measured than GDP. If the results are similar, when using GDP 
and infant mortality as the dependent variables, I can have more confidence in my results. I will 
also use changes in infant mortality as a dependent variable to compare them to results I get using 
changes in GDP as the dependent variable.  
4.2.2 Data on Ethnic Fractionalization 
For data on ethnic fractionalization I use the measures constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). There 
are three measures of fractionalization constructed Alesina et al. (2003), one for comprehensive 
ethnic fractionalization, one for linguistic fractionalization and one for religious fractionalization. 
The comprehensive ethnic fractionalization takes into account, besides linguistic differences, also 
other perceived differences in ethnicity. These perceived differences vary from country to country, 
but one example is, how people are assigned to an ethnic group based on skin color in the United 
States. 
 I will use the more comprehensive measure of ethnic fractionalization, as most of the models 
presented earlier are more driven by the effects of perceived ethnic differences, such as 
heterogeneous preferences or reduced social capital, rather than linguistic effects. 
The Alesina et al. (2003) could be criticized on the grounds that division between different ethnic 
groups is not clear-cut. As Fearon (2003) notes, it is not clear which ethnic division is salient in the 
society, as this is based on the perception of people living in that society. A good example of this 
could be Latinos in the United States. Should Latinos form an ethnic group or are the relevant 
ethnic groups based on the country of origin, in which case Mexicans and Puerto Ricans would 
form their own ethnic groups.  
Fearon (2003) takes this into account, when constructing another index of ethnic diversity. This is 
not only based on the size and amount of ethnic groups, but also on the distance between two ethnic 
groups. This distance is based on linguistic differences between the languages spoken by different 
ethnic groups. As an example imagine two countries which have two ethnic groups comprising half 
of the population, but in the first country the two groups speak very distinct languages. Using the 
Alesina et al. (2003) measure, the two countries would have the same amount of ethnic 
fractionalization, but using The Fearon (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization the first country 
would be more diverse. 
The Fearon (2003) index has problems of its own. The amount of ethnic groups, however 
imprecisely measured, might be more relevant for economic growth than a measure that takes the 
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distances into account. The Fearon (2003) measure is only based on ethnic groups that are separated 
by different languages and it might therefore omit some relevant information on the ethnic divisions 
in the society. Using United States again as an example, the Fearon measure of ethnic 
fractionalization would give a low measure for the country, even though United States is generally 
considered quite a heterogeneous country in terms of ethnic fractionalization. 
I will use the Fearon measure of ethnic fractionalization as an alternative measure to check for the 
robustness of the results. While neither measure of ethnic fractionalization that I use is perfect, if 
the results using both of these measures are similar, I feel I can be confident in my results. 
4.2.3 Data on Institutions 
A general problem with measuring the quality of institutions is that different measures of 
institutional quality are highly correlated. While the risk of expropriation is clearly different from 
perceived corruption, the two measures have correlation coefficient of 0.69. Such a high correlation 
makes it likely, that it is impossible to separate the effect of these two variables on any dependent 
variable of interest. 
Another problem is that any measure of institutions is always quite imprecise. The main measure 
that I use, risk of expropriation, is based on subjective evaluation on this risk. A subjective measure 
like this will contain some errors. 
I will mainly use two measures of institutional quality in the following empirical work. The first 
one is a measure for the risk of expropriation that comes from International Country Risk Guide. 
The risk is based on subjective assessment of risk for international investors on the risk of 
government expropriation of their property. 
The motivation for using this index is twofold. First of all, there are theoretical reasons to suspect 
that ethnic fractionalization might affect GDP differently in different contexts, where property 
rights are more or less protected. For example, property rights might make trust a less important 
feature in a society, which makes the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on trust less 
meaningful. The second reason for using this index is that it is, as explained previously, highly 
correlated with different measures of institutional quality. For that reason, it can be thought of as a 
measure of institutional quality in general. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) criticize using this risk of expropriation measure as a measurement of 
institutional quality based on several reasons. The first criticism is that this measurement doesn’t 
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really reflect institutions. Instead these measures could reflect policy choices that can be chosen in 
different institutional contexts. Glaeser et al. state that institutions should reflect constraints on the 
government and these constraints should be fairly durable. For example the authors note that an 
unconstrained dictator could choose to respect private property as a matter of policy.  
Glaeser et al. substantiate these criticisms by noting that the risk of expropriation measure is quite 
volatile and therefore can’t reflect deep institutional arrangements in a country. Institutions almost 
by definition should be something that change slowly. The paper also notes that this measure of 
institutions rises with per capita income which suggests that there might be some reverse causality 
between the two. 
Risk of expropriation is also only weakly correlated with less volatile constitutional measures of 
institutions, such as measures of judicial independence and judicial review of constitutions. If you 
assume that these constitutional measures reflect deeper rules, by which the rulers has to abide by, 
then this lack of correlation can imply that risk of expropriation indeed only reflects the policy 
choices of the rulers, not institutions. 
While risk of expropriation is a measure that is clearly imperfect, there are still reasons to use the 
measure. The fact that many measures of institutional quality are highly correlated with each other 
makes it more likely that the differences are not due to just policy choices, but that they reflect more 
permanent aspects of the society.  
Another measure that I use in the empirical part is Gastil’s measure of political rights, which can be 
thought of as a measure on democracy. The measure is based on, whether the citizens living in a 
country have certain political rights, such as a right to vote in an election. A lot of the models in the 
previous section were such, where ethnic fractionalization would have a different effect in more and 
less democratic countries. I find it then reasonable to study, whether democracy has a different 
effect compared to risk of expropriation. 
Interestingly the two main variables that I use to measure institutional quality, the risk of 
expropriation and the measure for democracy are not that highly correlated. The correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is only 0.35. 
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4.2.4 Settler mortality as an instrument 
The data for settler mortality comes from the working paper version of Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2000) paper that establishes the link between settler mortality and the quality of 
institutions.  
There is a lot of discussion on the validity of settler mortality as an instrument for institutions. Two 
main criticisms come from Albouy (2012) and Glaeser et al. (2004). I will present both of these 
criticisms in turn.  
Albouy (2012) mainly criticizes the data used in Acemogly, Johnson and Robinson (2001). The data 
on mortality is mostly based on the mortality of the soldiers. Albouy (2012) criticizes that the 
mortality estimates come from military campaigns in some countries and from soldiers stationed in 
barracks in others. The paper also claims that the mortality rates are implausibly high in some cases, 
where the data only comes from a single campaign that experienced unusually high mortality based 
on an outbreak of disease. 
The mortality data in Latin America comes from the mortality rates for bishops. Obviously the 
mortality rates are different for bishops and soldiers living in the same country, as bishops generally 
live under more sanitized conditions. The original Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson paper fixes 
this by benchmarking the bishop on data based on countries, where there exists data for both 
soldiers and bishops.  
Some of the mortality data comes from African laborers brought from another country. Albouy 
(2012) states that mortality rates from these laborers also can’t be compared to those of soldiers.  
Albouy (2012) also states that the mortality rates are incorrectly extrapolated to neighboring 
countries. The paper also claims that it is not transparent, how the extrapolation about settler 
mortality is made from one country to another. Therefore he claims that it is very difficult to 
evaluate, whether this extrapolation makes sense or not. 
Albouy (2012) proposes to fix these problems by removing the extrapolated data and adding 
dummies for situations, where the data comes from campaigning soldiers, Latin American bishops 
or African laborers. The result from these changes is that the original results from Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson are no longer significant. 
The claims are countered in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2012). The paper states that the 
extrapolation to neighboring countries is based on historical evidence and it is legitimate. They also 
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share some methods for doing this interpolation. To counter the claim that mortality rates are 
implausible high in some countries, they cap the mortality rates at various levels. When this is done, 
the results are robust to all the other criticisms raised by Albouy (2012). Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2012) also claim that Albouy’s campaign dummy is inconsistently applied, and if 
applied more consistently, the results are robust. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2012) also notes that Albouy needs to discard more than 60% of 
the data to get non-results even without capping the mortality estimates. The paper also notes that 
even then, the non-result is driven by one outlier Gambia, and if Gambia is removed the results are 
again significant. The authors claim that Gambia is an anomaly, with its post-1995 political 
performance implying much worse institutions than its 1995 score on institutional quality would 
imply. 
While the counter-claims made by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2012) are reasonable, the 
criticism still shows some potential problems with the underlying data. If nothing else, it shows that 
it is difficult to have reliable data on the potential settler mortality during the colonial times. It is 
advisable then, to be cautious about the results based on this data. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) also criticize the instruments used in the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
paper. As explained earlier Glaeser et al. (2004) note that constitutional measures of institutions are 
not highly correlated with the measures of institutions used in the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
paper. The paper notes that settler mortality is uncorrelated with these constitutional measures of 
institutions. This raises doubts, whether settler mortality really was a major determinant of 
institutions. Obviously, there are also problems using the constitutional measures to measure the 
institutional quality. I will discuss these problems in a later section. 
Glaeser et al. also note that settler mortality could potentially affect current GDP through other 
means than institutions thus making the instrument invalid. The settlers that moved to the colonies 
brought with them other things than institutions, such as human capital or diseases. Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) note that it is necessary to control for country characteristics that are 
related to both settler mortality and current income, but the human capital or disease issues 
mentioned by Glaeser et al. are not among the control variables. 
The Glaser et al. paper notes that settler mortality is also highly correlated with schooling in 1960 
and 2000, which might give some indication that the major channel by which settler mortality 
affects GDP is through human capital. When instrumenting for both schooling and institutions and 
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using the predicted values of both in a regression, schooling is significant and institutions are not. 
This suggests that settler mortality might not a valid instrument for institutions as there are other 
ways by which it could affect current income. Then again, schooling is not a perfect measure of 
human capital and institutions of the country as well as its GDP clearly affect the amount of 
schooling. 
The criticisms of Glaeser et al. are quite severe and it is not completely clear, whether settler 
mortality really is a good instrument for institutions or not. Nonetheless, it is an instrument widely 
used in the literature and using the instrument for my empirical part can at least give some 
indication, whether institutions actually affect the effects of ethnic fractionalization in a robust 
manner. 
4.2.5 Data on Constitutional Institutions 
The data on constitutional measures of institutions comes from La Porta et al. (2004). The two 
measures are judicial independence and judicial review of constitution. The first variable takes a 
higher value, when constitutional rules allow the executive to have less say in the judicial process. 
The latter variable takes higher value, when the judiciary has more power to overturn laws that it 
deems unconstitutional. 
Both of these measures can be thought of as constraints on the executive. As such, they are 
conceptually related to my main issues of interest democracy and property rights, although the 
correlation between other measures of property rights and democracy are not highly correlated with 
these variables. Because the constitutional variables can be thought of as deeper measures of these 
things that are less subject to change, it makes sense to use them as an alternative measure to test for 
the robustness of my empirical analysis.  
These measures are intended to measure constitutional rules. It might well be that these 
constitutional rules are not followed. The measures are intended to measure constraints on the 
rulers. However, the fact that the measures are not highly correlated to, for example, the risk of 
expropriation makes it questionable, whether these measures are meaningful at all. If the executive 
can still choose to expropriate property, how is the executive constrained at all. 
If this data is indeed meaningless, it is probable that there are no statistically significant 
relationships to GDP per capita or infant mortality, whether alone or in the interaction term with 
ethnic fractionalization. If the constitutional rules are just rules that are not followed, they shouldn’t 
affect the economic welfare of the country too much. 
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4.2.6 Control Variables 
I use similar control variables as those used in the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) paper, 
which first instrumented institutions on settler mortality. The justification for this is that the main 
empirical part of the thesis, where I instrument for institutions is somewhat similar to the empirical 
analysis of that paper. The controls are also among the most common ones used in the literature on 
the topic. 
First of all, I will control for latitude. Latitude is correlated with ethnic fractionalization and it also 
might affect economic development due to climate and other such considerations, such as disease 
environment. My measure of latitude comes from La Porta et al. (1999) 
There will be controls for natural resources of the country. Natural resources might affect the GDP 
of the country through various means. There might be income from these resources and on the other 
hand Dutch disease might have a negative effect on the country. There is also some evidence (Sachs 
and Warner 1995) that natural resources affect the institutions of a country, so controlling for them 
is important. The measures of natural resources come from Parker (1997) and they include the 
amount of zinc, iron, gold and oil in a country and also a measure of how many minerals are found 
on the country. 
For similar reasons, I will also control for soil quality. Soil quality might directly affect GDP by for 
example making agriculture more lucrative. Soil quality might also be correlated with institutions, if 
we assume that institutions might be different in a predominantly agrarian country. The measures of 
soil quality come from (Parker 1997). 
In the instrumental variable regressions I will employ several more controls. There are reasons to 
expect that settler mortality is correlated with these measures and as such, not controlling for them, 
might give the impression that the relevant effect is through institution and not through some other 
variable that is correlated with settler mortality. 
Current malaria environment is correlated with settler mortality, as malaria was a big killer for 
settlers in the colonial times and past malaria environment is correlated to current malaria 
environment. I will control for current malaria prevalence, using a measure of how much of the 
country resides in an area, where malaria is a risk. The measure comes from Gallup and Sachs 
(1998). The problem with using the current malaria environment as a control variable is that it is 
probably not exogenous with respect to GDP. Richer countries have been able to eradicate malaria. 
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I will also control for amount of population currently living in the country that is of European 
descent. This is clearly related to the amount of settlers that moved to a country. It might also affect 
current income if, for example, it facilitates trade with European countries. The measure is 
constructed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). 
I will take the criticism of Glaeser et al. (2004) into account by controlling for current schooling in 
different countries. The measure I use is the logarithm of average years of schooling by a resident in 
the country. The measure comes from Barro and Lee (2000). Obviously the point of Glaeser et al. 
(2004) was that, settler mortality could affect current development through various channels, and 
human capital proxied by the years of schooling is just one of the channels. Controlling for 
schooling still might make the results a little bit more reliable. 
4.2.7 Missing Data 
The fact that my data consists of only former colonies limits the sample size quite a bit. There are 
only 65 countries, which have the data available for institutions, settler mortality and current GDP. 
There is also some missing data on the control variables, so adding further controls diminishes the 
sample size even further. This increases the standard errors, which makes finding any statistically 
significant effect more difficult. 
 
4.3 Analysis 
4.3.1 Baseline results 
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
   Ethnic fractionalization -1.54*** 1.83 1.99 3.00 3.73 6.06*** 
  (0.48) (2.05) (2.07) (2.17) (2.33) (2.01) 
Institutions 0.61*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 1.00*** 
  (0.08) (0.189) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) 
EF*Institutions   -.054* -0.54* -0.79** -0.85** -0.95*** 
    (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.36) (0.30) 
Latitude     0.66 -0.23 0.06 0.20 
      (1.08) (1.26) (1.36) (1.13) 
P-value for natural resources       0.14 0.22 0.24 
P-value for soil quality         0.76 0.56 
P-value for regional dummies           0.00 
Adjusted R^2 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.70 
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Table 4: Regression results for risk of expropriation. 
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In this section, I will study the interaction between ethnic fractionalization and institutional quality 
without instrumenting for institutions. The institutions might be endogenous, which is a problem 
that I will take into account in the later sections. 
I will first use risk of expropriation as the measure for the quality of institutions. As expected ethnic 
fractionalization has a negative effect on the current income. Better institutions have a positive 
effect, which is not too surprising either. 
Next I add an interaction between institutions and ethnic fractionalization. Surprisingly now the 
sign for ethnic fractionalization is positive and the sign for the interaction term is negative, which 
suggest that ethnic fractionalization is actually worse for GDP per capita in countries with good 
institutions. The coefficient for ethnic fractionalization is not significant anymore, but the 
coefficient for the interaction term is significant at the 10%-level. 
The results seem to suggest that the effect of institutions seems to be different in previously 
colonialized countries, when compared to a sample of all countries in general. Naive reading of the 
results would suggest that ethnic fractionalization only has a negative effect on income, when it is 
combined with good institutions. While this result is very counterintuitive, there is some theoretical 
justification for this, as explained earlier in the thesis. 
The results are similar, when controlling for latitude. The coefficient for the interaction term is still 
barely significant at the 10% -level. Controlling for natural resources changes the results a bit. Now 
the coefficient interaction term for institutions and ethnic diversity is much larger and significant at 
the 5% -level. Adding controls for soil quality further increases the coefficient for the interaction 
term. 
Adding dummies for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa also changes the results in an 
interesting way. The coefficient for the interaction term is still higher. The result is also significant 
at the 1% -level. The coefficient for ethnic fractionalization is also significant at the 1% -level and 
the coefficient is positive, as it was in the previous regressions. 
When the measure of ethnic fractionalization is replaced by Fearon’s (2003) measure of cultural 
distance the results remain basically the same. (For a table of results see appendix A) The 
interaction term is still negative, although now it is significant at the 5% -level, even without 
including any controls. This measure is correlated with the basic measure of ethnic 
fractionalization, so this is not highly surprising. The results with using this measure of ethnic 
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diversity are also robust to adding a wide range of control variables and the coefficient is significant 
in all the regressions ran. 
I also see, whether the results are different, if the dependent variable is infant mortality instead of 
GDP per capita. (Again see appendix A) There is a strong negative correlation between infant 
mortality and income, so the results should be similar to the results presented previously. 
The results are indeed similar. The interaction term is now positive and statistically significant. So 
again the naive reading of the results suggests that ethnic fractionalization increases infant mortality 
when the institutional context is more benign. The results are robust to adding a wide variety of 
control variables. In all the regressions run, the coefficient for the interaction term remained 
significant. 
Interpretation of the interaction term is always somewhat ambiguous. It seems that higher ethnic 
fractionalization is only associated with negative outcomes, when it is paired with good institutions. 
Interestingly the coefficient for the interaction term and the term for institutional quality are in most 
of the regressions pretty close to each other. I could be that another plausible interpretation for the 
results would be that higher ethnic fractionalization leads to good institutions being less effective. 
With the maximal ethnic fractionalization of 1, good institutions no longer lead to better 
developmental outcomes. 
The results, while interesting, can't be taken too seriously however. Institutions are endogenous 
with respect to income and with respect to infant mortality. This could bias the results towards 
larger coefficients and the results could be statistically significant, while there is no causal effect. 
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
   Ethnic fractionalization -1.90*** -1.62 -1.29 -2.04 -1.19 -0.85 
  (0.59) (1.32) (1.33) (1.43) (1.51) (1.04) 
Democracy 0.30*** -0.27 -0.25 -0.26 -.022 -0.31* 
  (0.08) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
EF*Democracy   -0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.36 
    (0.29) 0.29 (029) (0.30) (0.30) 
Latitude     1.90 0.62 1.01 0.66 
      (1.31) (1.49) (1.58) (1.51) 
P-value for natural resources       0.03 0.03 0.08 
P-value for soil quality         0.55 0.63 
P-value for regional dummies           0.01 
Adjusted R^2 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.39 0.49 
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Table 5: Regression results for democracy 
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If we use democracy as the measure of institutions the results are somewhat different. The 
interaction term is not significant in any regressions, which is in contrast with Collier (2000). The 
coefficient for the interaction term changes sign, depending on, what control variables are used, 
which is not surprising, because, as the standard errors indicate, the range for plausible values for 
the coefficient is quite wide. A reasonable conclusion is that democracy is not relevant in 
magnifying or diminishing the effects of ethnic fractionalization on GDP per capita. 
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
  Ethnic fractionalization 3.02 3.05 3.65 4.82* 5.08** 
  (2.52) (2.54) (2.50) (2.70) (2.37) 
Institutions 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) 
EF*Institutions -0.61* -0.61* -0.86** -0.94*** -.091*** 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.14) (0.31) 
Democracy -0.11 -.011 -0.20 -0.16 -0.16 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
EF*Democracy -0.13 -0.12 0.004 -0.06 0.20 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
Latitude   0.22 -0.40 -0.14 -0.04 
    (1.05) (1.19) (1.29) (1.15) 
P-value for natural resources     0.07 0.11 0.20 
P-value for soil quality       0.72 0.60 
P-value for regional dummies         0.00 
Adjusted R^2 0.59 0.62 0.69 0.70 0.70 
N 65 65 65 65 65 
Table 6: Regressions results for democracy and risk of expropriation 
If we include both risk of expropriation and democracy as the measures of institutions, the 
interaction term is significant, when the measure of institutions is the risk of expropriation. Again 
the interaction term with democracy is not significant. The results are similar to those in Easterly 
(2001), where the interaction term with democracy was not significant either. The sign for the 
interaction term with risk of expropriation is still the opposite from the previous studies. 
It is quite worrying that the results are in contrast with all the previous studies studying the 
interaction between ethnic fractionalization and institutions, most notably, those of Collier (2000) 
and Easterly (2001) There are several possible reasons for this. Either the effect of the interplay 
between institutions and ethnic fractionalization is different in countries that were previously 
colonializes, or there is something wrong with my results or the results of Collier (2000) and 
Easterly (2001). Or there is something wrong with both my results and theirs. Other reason might 
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be that effects are different in the long-term explaining the differences with my regressions dealing 
with level of GDP per capita and Collier’s and Easterly’s which are more concerned with growth. 
As a further check for robustness I will use changes in GDP per capita and in infant mortality as the 
dependent variables. The changes are from 1995 to 2005. The motivation for this is to see, whether 
the results are similar to these presented previously. It will also make it easier to compare the results 
to the previous studies on ethnic fractionalization, some of which were concerned with changes in 
the GDP rather than the level of per capita GDP.  
As can be seen from appendix B, none of the coefficients is significant in any regressions. The only 
exception is that ethnic fractionalization slows the decline in infant mortality, which is probably due 
to the fact that decline in infant mortality is related to public good provision, which as shown 
previously is negatively affected by ethnic fractionalization. 
The main conclusion about the regressions with changes should probably be that there is too much 
noise in the short-term rates of growth, and even if some issue is relevant in the longer term, it is not 
significant during a ten year period. 
4.3.2 Constitutional Measures of Institutions 
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
   Ethnic fractionalization 4.81 6.08* 3.27 3.08 0.69 
  (3.59) (3.40) (3.47) (3.54) (3.99) 
Judicial Independence 3.96** 3.70** 2.55 3.25 1.51 
  (1.81) (1.69) (1.75) (1.80) (1.85) 
EF*Judicial Independence -7.42* -7.78** -5.13 -1.58 1.56 
  (4.03) (3.76) (3.88) (4.33) (4.98) 
Latitude   3.68** 1.51 1.31 2.09 
    (1.64) (3.28) (2.26) (2.31) 
P-value for natural resources     0.27 0.37 0.25 
P-value for soil quality       0.81 0.62 
P-value for regional dummies         0.28 
Adjusted R^2 0.09 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.31 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
Table 7: Regression results with judicial independence as the measure of institutions 
I will at first use judicial independence as the measure of institutions replacing the risk of 
expropriation measure. In the regression with no controls, the effect of the interaction term is 
similar to that in the previous section. The coefficient is similar in magnitude and it is statistically 
significant at 10% -level. 
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Adding control for latitude doesn't change the results much. However adding controls for natural 
resources diminishes the coefficient somewhat and the coefficient is no longer statistically 
significant. 
When I added further controls for soil quality changes the sign of the coefficient for the interaction 
term. The coefficient is now positive, quite small and not statistically significant. 
The results when the dependent variable is infant mortality are quite similar (see appendix D). At 
first the coefficient for the interaction term is positive as expected in the light of the previous 
regressions and also significant at 5% -level. The coefficient is significant at the 10%-level, when 
controlling for latitude. With any further controls added, none of the coefficients is significant any 
longer. This result seems to be in line, with the results from the regressions with GDP/capita as the 
dependent variable.  
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
   Ethnic fractionalization 0.32 1.72 -1.42 0.78 0.48 
  (4.07) (3.85) (3.76) (5.60) (5.60) 
Constitutional Review 0.87 1.28 -1.77 -1.37 -1.63 
  (3.14) (2.94) (2.93) (3.63) (3.62) 
EF*Constitutional Review -2.03 -2.92 0.96 0.72 1.84 
  (5.91) (5.52) (5.32) (8.34) (8.46) 
Latitude   3.89** 1.12 1.15 1.67 
    (1.73) (2.28) (2.77) (2.79) 
P-value for natural resources     0.10 0.14 0.36 
P-value for soil quality       0.76 0.97 
P-value for regional dummies         0.34 
Adjusted R^2 -0.07 0.07 0.24 0.13 0.15 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
Table 8: Regression results with constitutional review as the measure of institutions 
Next I will use judicial constitutional review as the measure of institutions. The results are 
somewhat similar in nature. While there is a negative coefficient for the interaction term, the 
coefficient is much smaller than in the previous regressions. It is also not statistically significant. 
The coefficient has a different sign, when controls for latitude and natural resources are added.  
All and all, these results suggest that institutional context, at least with these measures of 
institutions, does not mitigate or exacerbate the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization. The 
results presented here also cast some doubt on the results of the previous section. It could be that the 
results of the previous section are robust and these constitutional measures of institutions are 
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different and do not affect the negative effects of ethnic diversity in a similar way or at all. It could 
still be that institutions proxied by risk of expropriation do worsen the effect of ethnic diversity. 
It is also possible that these constitutional measures reflect only constitutional rules that are not 
followed by the leaders of the country. In this case these measures are not a meaningful measure of 
anything, as discussed earlier in the data section. If this is really the case, it would be surprising, if I 
did find any statistically significant results. 
Another concern is that there is relatively little data for these regressions. The data for the 
constitutional measures is only available for 31 countries in my sample. It might be difficult to find 
any statistically relationship in such a small sample, especially with a lot of controls. It is important 
to note that none of the coefficient for any control variable is significant either in the regressions 
with a lot of controls. It might be that the lack of any results in these regressions just reflects the 
fact that there is too limited data. 
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4.3.3 Instrumenting for Institutions 
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
     Two Stage Least Squares                 
Ethnic fractionalization -8.64 -10.59 -12.70 -20.13 -2.47 -0.63 -84.12 8.41 
  (7.56) (2.97) (19.59) (35.20) (10.53) (8.00) (1201.47) (10.57) 
Insitutions 0.67 0.71 0.91 1.03 0.95** 0.95*** 0.38 0.68 
  (0.47) (0.51) (0.88) (1.15) (0.44) (0.35) (5.56) (0.47) 
EF*Institutions 1.31 1.54 2.02 3.06 0.30 -0.05 11.70 -1.25 
  (1.27) (1.54) (3.41) (5.73) (1.65) (1.27) (168.77) (1.45) 
Latitude   -3.09 -2.30 -4.99 -1.89 -2.89 -28.38 -0.60 
    (1.97) (3.76) (7.68) (2.14) (1.77) (375.60) (2.57) 
Europeans in 1975           1.53** 7.34 1.29 
            (0.74) (87.74) (0.87) 
Schoooling in 2010             -8.02 1.30 
              (122.87) (1.09) 
Current malaria prevalence         -1.01 -0.68 -1.66 -0.68 
          (0.72) (0.58) (12.32) (1.02) 
P-value for natural resources     0.96 0.99 0.94 0.64 1.00 0.69 
P-value for soil quality       0.99 0.92 0.83 1.00 0.50 
P-value for regional dummies               0.73 
First Stage for Institutions                 
Log Mortality 
-
1.46*** 
-
1.37*** 
-
1.19** -1.15** -1.40*** -1.39*** -1.32** 0.97 
 
(0.40) (0.40) (0.45) (0.45) (0.51) (0.52) (0.52) (0.69) 
Log mortality*ethnic 
fractionalization 1.39** 1.35** 1.26* 1.21* (1.50 1.47* 1.85** 1.60 
 
(0.58) (0.57) (0.65) (0.66) (0.75) (0.76) (0.79) (1.04) 
Adjusted R^2 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.45 0.45 
First stage for EF*Institutions                 
Log Mortality -0.19 -0.13 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 0.08 
 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.30) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.46) 
Log mortality*ethnic 
fractionalization -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.11 0.04 0.10 
 
(0.38) (0.37) (0.43) (0.43) (0.50) (0.50) (0.52) (0.69) 
Adjusted R^2 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.80 0.81 
Table 9: Regression results with instrumented institutions 
The basic variable of interest is the interaction term institutions*ethnic fractionalization, with 
institutions being instrumented by settler mortality.  
Because I have two instrumented variables institutions and institutions*ethnic fractionalization, I 
also need two instruments. If the logarithm of settler mortality is a valid instrument then log settler 
mortality*ethnic fractionalization should be a valid instrument as well and I can therefore use that 
as the second instrument. 
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In the regression with not controls, the coefficients in terms of their sign and magnitude are closer 
to those expected in the light of previous literature. Now ethnic fractionalization has a negative 
affect that is mitigated by good institutions, and with the best institutions the ethnic fractionalization 
the marginal effect of ethnic fractionalization on GDP is small or non-existent. However, none of 
the included variables is significant, not even institutions.  
It is also questionable, how reliable are the results that are completely opposite from the results 
reached without the instruments. It is difficult to imagine a source of bias that would completely 
overturn the results. A more likely interpretation is that the underlying relationship is weak. 
When controls are added for latitude and natural resources, the results are basically the same. The 
coefficient for ethnic fractionalization and the interaction term are now larger, but the standard 
errors are also larger, so the coefficients are still not significant. 
Adding another control for malaria prevalence changes the sign for both ethnic fractionalization and 
interaction term. The coefficients are not significant. Adding other controls for the amount of 
current Europeans and schooling do not basically change the results. The magnitude of coefficients 
change, but they are not significant in any of the instrumental variable regressions run here. 
The results are very similar, when infant mortality is the dependent variable, as can be seen from 
appendix E. However, in this case ethnic fractionalization and the interaction term are significant at 
the 10%-level in the regression with no controls. According to the results ethnic fractionalization 
causes the infant mortality to be higher and good institutions diminish this effect. In regressions 
with any controls this relationship is no longer statistically significant. 
Based on the IV regressions one forced to conclude that there is little evidence of institutions having 
a causal effect mitigating or exacerbating the effects of ethnic fractionalization. The instrumented 
interaction term was not significant in any of the regressions, and the coefficient changed sign, 
when adding for controls, which even further suggest that the results reached were basically 
random. 
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5. Conclusion 
The main aim of the thesis was to find out, whether the negative link between ethnic 
fractionalization and negative economic outcomes could be mediated by good institutions. There 
were some theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that this would be the case.  
While there was not too much actual theory on, how ethnic fractionalization would have different 
effects in different contexts, most theories on the topic were quite context dependent, so it is 
plausible to assume that the effects of ethnic fractionalization would indeed be different under 
different institutional contexts. 
In the empirical part of the paper I could not find any evidence for my hypothesis that institutions 
mitigate the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization. On the contrary, I did find some weak 
evidence that ethnic fractionalization might only cause problems in societies with good institutions. 
Even these results were not robust, when using a less volatile measure of institutions or when using 
instrumental variables for institutions. 
There are several reason, why institutions might not actually be relevant for the economic effects of 
ethnic fractionalization.  
A model, where the institutional context is explicitly relevant is Collier (2000). In the model ethnic 
fractionalization is more harmful under a dictatorship, as a dictator can choose higher level of taxes 
to distribute this tax income to a relatively small ethnic group. The model doesn’t take into account 
the fact that this might happen in more democratic context as well, as political power might be 
unevenly divided between different ethnic groups. 
In relation to public goods, I speculated that the preferences of median voter are not taken into 
account in less liberal context. This might not be true to a large enough extent to make a difference, 
as even under a dictatorship, the preferences of the people are taken into account as the leaders 
might be afraid of unrest and revolts. 
It is also not clear that more public goods always translates into a richer society. Therefore, it might 
be that the fact that ethnic fractionalization diminishes the amount of public goods would be good 
for the society. It is also possible that the amount of public goods is not too relevant for growth, 
which would make institutions that take the median voter into account less relevant. 
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I also speculated that under some institutional contexts trust is less necessary for the functioning of 
the society. For example, modern judicial systems make trust less necessary. On the other hand, 
there are reasons, why trust is more necessary under modern institutional context. In more modern 
context it is more important to interact with strangers through markets than it is under less 
developed institutional context. This would make trust more important for the society. 
It might that institutional context is therefore not relevant. This leaves the mystery that my results 
are different from previous studies on the topic. There are reasons to not take the results of this 
study too seriously. 
The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. What I think the empirical work presented here 
most clearly shows, that this is an issue that is very hard, if not impossible, to study in the context of 
cross country regressions. The problems include lack of data, multicollinearity as many of the 
variables of interest are highly correlated and the difficulty of finding good instruments for the 
variables of interest. The multicollinearity problem is worsened, when adding interaction variables. 
It might that this kind of data cannot yield any conclusions on the topic. 
While my empirical investigation suggests that institutional context doesn’t matter on, whether 
ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on the society, it is still my opinion that this is an area, 
where further empirical investigation might be warranted. It still cannot be overlooked that previous 
empirical findings did find that institutional context does matter and in my own regressions without 
instrumenting for institutions, the institutional context did matter. 
There are several problems in my empirical investigation and there are also several problems in the 
previous empirical investigations on this topic. It would be interesting to study this with more 
micro-level data, as in Miguel (2004). Unfortunately, I have no idea on, where one could find such 
data.   
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Appendix A: Robustness checks for baseline regressions 
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
   Ethnic distance 3.69 4.00 4.06 5.00 5.72* 
  (2.47) (2.50) (2.59) (3.29) (3.14) 
Institutions 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.89*** 0.96*** 0.86*** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) 
ED*Institutions -0.88** -0.90** -0.97** -1.15** -1.02** 
  (0.38) (0.39) (0.41) (0.51) (0.49) 
Latitude   0.86 -0.32 -0.38 -0.67 
    (0.95) (1.14) (1.23) (1.16) 
P-value for natural resources     0.18 0.38 0.37 
P-value for soil quality       0.76 0.97 
P-value for regional dummies         0.002 
Adjusted R^2 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.68 
N 60 60 60 60 60 
 
Dependent variable is logarithm of infant mortality 
    Ethnic fractionalization 1.82*** -0.79 -0.72 -1.88 -2.14 -3.33*** 
  (0.29) (1.21) (1.22) (1.30) (1.37) (1.21) 
Institutions -0.34*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.70*** 
  (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) 
EF*Institutions   0.42** 0.42** 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 
    (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.18) 
Latitude     0.32 1.17 0.65 0.60 
      (0.63) (0.73) (0.77) (0.66) 
P-value for natural resources       0.11 0.47 0.46 
P-value for soil quality         0.41 0.76 
P-value for regional dummies           0.00 
Adjusted R^2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.77 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 
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Appendix B: Regressions with changes 
Dependent variable is changes in GDP/Capita from 1995 to 2005 
    Ethnic fractionalization 0.20 0.17 0.50 0.54 0.65 0.97 0.28 0.99 
  (0.28) (0.29) (1.27) (1.37) (1.41) (1.58) (1.74) (1.83) 
Institutions   -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 
    (0.05) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
EF*Institutions     -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07 
      (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) 
Initial GDP/capita       0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Latitude         0.27 0.11 -0.42 -0.49 
          (0.70) (0.82) (0.89) (0.90) 
P-value for natural resources           0.71 0.79 0.77 
P-value for soil quality             0.62 0.51 
P-value for regional dummies               0.44 
Adjusted R^2 -.001 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
 
Dependent variable is changes in infant mortality from 1995 to 2005 
    Ethnic fractionalization 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.36 0.41* 0.34 0.42* 0.33 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Institutions   0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
EF*Institutions     -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Latitude       0.23 0.13 0.09 0.11 
        (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
P-value for natural resources         0.00 0.03 0.04 
P-value for soil quality           0.15 0.25 
P-value for regional dummies             0.38 
Adjusted R^2 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.40 0.44 0.44 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
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Appendix C: Regression with both judicial independence and constitutional review 
Dependent variable is logarithm of GDP/capita in 2010 
   Ethnic fractionalization 4.24 6.34 1.85 -0.00 -2.66 
  (5.01) (4.78) (4.75) (7.17) (7.49) 
Judicial Independence 4.21** 3.83** 2.92 2.65 1.79 
  (1.96) (1.84) (1.80) (1.98) (2.06) 
EF*Judicial Independence -7.85* -8.01** -5.79 -1.85 1.17 
  (4.27) (3.99) (3.94) (5.00) (5.79) 
Constitutional Review -1.22 -0.47 -2.80 -2.82 -2.90 
  (3.16) (2.97) (2.97) (3.54) (3.49) 
EF*Constitutional Review 1.34 -0.13 2.66 4.15 5.40 
  (5.87) (5.53) (5.37) (8.46) (8.37) 
Latitude   3.68** 0.77 0.67 1.78 
    (1.71) (2.27) (2.67) (2.80) 
P-value for natural resources     0.18 0.14 0.29 
P-value for soil quality       0.56 0.72 
P-value for regional dummies         0.33 
Adjusted R^2 0.02 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.24 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
 
  
70 
 
Appendix D: Regression with infant mortality and constitutional institutions 
Dependent variable is logarithm of infant mortality in 2010 
   Ethnic fractionalization -2.20 -2.59 -1.38 -0.91 0.83 
  (2.24) (2.27) (2.50) (2.53) (2.86) 
Judicial Independence -2.31** -2.24* -1.81 -1.42 -0.96 
  (1.13) (1.13) (1.26) 1.29 (1.32) 
EF*Judicial Independence 4.35** 4.46* 3.48 0.78 -1.49 
  (2.51) (2.51) (2.79) (3.10) (3.56) 
Latitude   -1.13 0.25 -0.11 -0.68 
    (2.51) (1.56) (1.62) (1.65) 
P-value for natural resources     0.68 0.65 0.46 
P-value for soil quality       0.70 0.49 
P-value for regional dummies         0.30 
Adjusted R^2 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.15 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
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Appendix E: Regression with infant mortality and instrumented institutions 
Dependent variable is logarithm of infant mortality in 2010 
     Two Stage Least Squares                 
Ethnic fractionalization 459.04* 524.60* 755.68 899.47 378.15 350.44 8176.95 -109.60 
  (230.92) (291.04) (824.21) (1216.18) (369.84) (308.46) (240907.2) (537.30) 
Insitutions 7.58 5.03 6.12 2.14 4.51 4.79 173.59 12.44 
  (14.70) (16.51) (41.63) (45.25) (18.73) (16.54) (4976.84) (28.21) 
EF*Institutions -69.03* -76.14 -121.07 -135.61 -55.22 -50.34 -1195.95 14.75 
  (39.06) (47.65) (144.148) (199.72) (59.85) (49.87) (35300.49) (77.84) 
Latitude   117.65 89.39 152.05 60.86 69.71 2254.52 7.51 
    (84.50) (133.47) (234.14) (63.95) (59.77) (66553.2) (122.69) 
Europeans in 1975           -16.47 -596.16 -22.56 
            (25.21) (17595.11) (42.79) 
Schoooling in 2010             667.22 -50.26 
              (20726.08) (43.79) 
Current malaria prevalence         33.88 32.04 162.54 44.09 
          (21.22) (19.20) (3820.22) (53.52) 
P-value for natural resources     0.98 0.99 0.95 0.92 1.00 1.00 
P-value for soil quality       0.98 0.87 0.86 1.00 1.00 
P-value for regional dummies               0.71 
First Stage for Institutions                 
Log Mortality 
-
1.56*** 
-
1.43*** -1.20** -1.14** -1.57** -1.52** -1.67** -1.26 
 
(0.44) (0.43) (0.53) (0.54) (0.67) (0.69) (0.70) (0.97) 
Log mortality*ethnic 
fractionalization 1.52** 1.44** 1.28* 1.21 1.73* 1.65 2.35** 2.01 
 
(0.64) (0.62) (0.76) (0.77) (0.97) (0.99) (1.04) (1.44) 
Adjusted R^2 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.44 0.43 
First stage for EF*Institutions                 
Log Mortality -0.25 -0.17 -0.13 -0.07 -0.23 -0.20 -0.24 -0.12 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.35) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.65) 
Log mortality*ethnic 
fractionalization -0.004 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.32 0.39 
 
(0.41) (0.41) (0.50) (0.50) (0.65) (0.66) (0.70) (0.95) 
Adjusted R^2 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.80 
 
 
 
